We propose an alternative measure of the long-term economic impact of mergers on firm value: post-acquisition changes in intrinsic value. Consistent with the literature on post-acquisition returns, acquirers tend to lose industry-adjusted intrinsic values in the three years following merger completion. Further analysis indicates that managers of firms that have both a high price-to-value ratio and a low price-to-book ratio tend to make acquisitions that increase intrinsic value. Managers of firms that have low price-to-value ratios and high price-to-book ratios tend to make intrinsic value-destroying acquisitions. Finally, using a simple return decomposition, we show that changes in intrinsic value and changes in valuation levels contribute to post-acquisition stock returns.
In a comprehensive sample of mergers and acquisitions, we find a reference price effect: Acquirers earn higher (lower) announcement-period returns when their pre-announcement stock prices are well below (near) their 52-week highs. This reference price effect is stronger in acquisitions of private targets, deals involving greater uncertainty, and acquirers with greater individual investor ownership, and it is reversed in the subsequent year. Further, acquirer reference prices affect bid premia and target announcement-period returns in deals with greater uncertainty in acquirer valuation. The overall evidence is consistent with investors irrationally using 52-week high prices as a measure of acquirer valuation.
We find evidence that the asset growth anomaly is due, in part, to investors’ behavioral biases. Two-way sorts based on asset growth and proxies for known behavioral biases (anchoring, recency, nominal price illusion, and lottery-seeking) indicate that the asset growth anomaly is stronger in stocks that investors affected by behavioral biases tend to buy and non-existent or negative in stocks they tend to sell. These results are not explained by limits of arbitrage or investor sentiment and hold in both portfolio analyses and regressions. The evidence suggests that behavioral investors’ attraction to certain stocks drives the asset growth anomaly.
There is a strong inverse relation between insider trading and institutional demand the same quarter and over the previous year. Our analysis suggests a combination of factors contribute to this relation. First, institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to trade. Second, insiders are more likely to buy low valuation and low lag return stocks while institutions are attracted to the opposite security characteristics. Last, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are more likely to view their securities as overvalued following a period when institutions were net buyers and undervalued following a period when institutions were net sellers.
Unlisted acquisitions differ from listed ones in three important aspects: the possibility of forming blockholders, which substitute debt as a monitoring mechanism; the liquidity discount, which mitigates managerial hubris; and the distinct deal process through which two-sided asymmetric information is revealed. Due to these differences, same firm and deal characteristics could induce heterogeneous market responses, depending on target listing status. We find that such heterogeneous responses exist in usual characteristics such as method of payment, relative size, acquirer size, leverage, and market-to-book ratios. After these heterogeneous responses are incorporated, the puzzling “listing effect” disappears. Our results also indicate that the conventional approach used to investigate pooled samples of listed and unlisted acquisitions is effectively misspecified due to omitted variables.
Our analysis suggests that boards focus on deviation from expected performance, rather than performance alone, in making the CEO turnover decision, especially when there is agreement (less dispersion) among analysts about the firm's earnings forecast or there are a large number of analysts following the firm. In addition, our results suggest that boards are more likely to appoint a CEO that will change firm policies and strategies (i.e., an outsider) when forecasted five-year EPS growth is low and there is greater uncertainty (more dispersion) among analysts about the firm's long-term forecasts.