Petter Solnør

Petter Solnør

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Petter Solnør

Department of Engineering Cybernetics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 March 2022 in Ocean Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MAMelih Akdağ
Melih Akdağ
PSPetter Solnør
Petter Solnør
TJTor Arne Johansen
Tor Arne Johansen

7 March 2022 in Journal of Field Robotics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PSPetter Solnør
Petter Solnør
ØVØystein Volden
Øystein Volden
KGKristoffer Gryte
Kristoffer Gryte
Slobodan PetrovicSlobodan Petrovic
Slobodan Petrovic
Thor I. FossenThor I. Fossen
Thor I. Fossen
Driven by advances in information and communication technologies, an increasing number of industries embrace unmanned and autonomous vehicles for services, such as public transportation, shipping, mapping, and remote surveillance. Unfortunately, these vehicles are vulnerable to passive and active cyber‐physical attacks that can be used for industrial espionage and hijacking attempts. Since attackers can use hijacked vehicles as weapons in terrorist attacks, ensuring the secure operation of such vehicles is critical to prevent the attacks from causing dire financial consequences, or worse, the loss of human lives. This study is motivated by the observation that most cybersecurity studies provide superficial, high‐level descriptions of vulnerabilities and attacks, and the true impact of the described attacks remains unclear. To address this problem, we demonstrate advanced manipulation attacks against an underactuated Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) which results in successful hijackings. Using state‐of‐the‐art cryptography, we also show how the signal transmission can be secured to avoid hijacking attempts actively steering the vehicle off course. Through field experiments, we demonstrate how the attacks affect the closed‐loop guidance, navigation, and control system and how the proposed countermeasures prevent these attacks from being successful. Our study is unique in that we provide a complete description of the attacked USV and give a detailed analysis of how spoofed navigation estimates affect the closed‐loop behavior of the underactuated USV.

9 September 2021 in Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ØVØystein Volden
Øystein Volden
PSPetter Solnør
Petter Solnør
Slobodan PetrovicSlobodan Petrovic
Slobodan Petrovic
Thor I. FossenThor I. Fossen
Thor I. Fossen
An ever-increasing number of autonomous vehicles use bandwidth-greedy sensors such as cameras and LiDARs to sense and act to the world around us. Unfortunately, signal transmission in vehicles is vulnerable to passive and active cyber-physical attacks that may result in loss of intellectual property, or worse yet, the loss of control of a vehicle, potentially causing great harm. Therefore, it is important to investigate efficient cryptographic methods to secure signal transmission in such vehicles against outside threats. This study is motivated by the observation that previous publications have suggested legacy algorithms, which are either inefficient or insecure for vision-based signals. We show how stream ciphers and authenticated encryption can be applied to transfer sensor data securely and efficiently between computing devices suitable for distributed guidance, navigation, and control systems. We provide an efficient and flexible pipeline of cryptographic operations on image and point cloud data in the Robot Operating System (ROS). We also demonstrate how image data can be compressed to reduce the amount of data to be encrypted, transmitted, and decrypted. Experiments on embedded computers verify that modern software cryptographic algorithms perform very well on large sensor data. Hence, the introduction of such algorithms should enhance security without significantly compromising the overall performance.

18 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PSPetter Solnør
Petter Solnør
Slobodan PetrovicSlobodan Petrovic
Slobodan Petrovic
Thor I. FossenThor I. Fossen
Thor I. Fossen
We consider encrypted guidance systems for straight-line path following. With cloud-computing technology, we can outsource computations in guidance systems to third-party providers, increasing scalability and enabling guidance-as-a-service. However, by remotely hosting a conventional guidance system on third-party infrastructure, we leak information such as the path of the vehicle. Potential customers may consider these leaks a serious breach of confidentiality, which limits the practical use of such systems. Therefore, to make cloud-based guidance systems viable, we would like to design guidance systems that we can host remotely without revealing confidential information to the host. To this end, we show that we can construct guidance systems that operate on encrypted position measurements, encrypted waypoints, and the bearing between each waypoint by using homomorphic encryption, effectively preventing the cloud host from identifying the vehicle's position. We show that the proposed guidance laws are locally exponentially stable and that the induced computational latency is appropriate for the real-time guidance of autonomous vehicles. Through field experiments, we demonstrate that an encrypted guidance system is practical and allows an unmanned surface vehicle to follow an encrypted path. The originality of this work lies in conceptualizing, designing, and experimentally validating an encrypted guidance system, unlike other studies that considered encrypted control systems.

1 January 2020 in Modeling, Identification and Control: A Norwegian Research Bulletin
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PSPetter Solnør
Petter Solnør