If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). By these three measures, audiences in ethics sessions did not appear to behave any more courteously than did audiences in non-ethics sessions. However, audiences in environmental ethics sessions did appear to leave behind less trash.
We present evidence that mainstream Anglophone philosophy is insular in the sense that participants in this academic tradition tend mostly to cite or interact with other participants in this academic tradition, while having little academic interaction with philosophers writing in other languages. Among our evidence: In a sample of articles from elite Anglophone philosophy journals, 97% of citations are citations of work originally written in English; 96% of members of editorial boards of elite Anglophone philosophy journals are housed in majority-Anglophone countries; and only one of the 100 most-cited recent authors in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy spent most of his career in non-Anglophone countries writing primarily in a language other than English. In contrast, philosophy articles published in elite Chinese-language and Spanish-language journals cite from a range of linguistic traditions, as do non-English-language articles in a convenience sample of established European-language journals. We also find evidence that work in English has more influence on work in other languages than vice versa and that when non-Anglophone philosophers cite recent work outside of their own linguistic tradition it tends to be work in English.
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted to make decisions in domains such as business, education, health care, and criminal justice. However, such algorithmic decision systems can have prevalent biases against marginalized social groups and undermine social justice. Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a recent development aiming to make an AI system’s decision processes less opaque and to expose its problematic biases. This paper argues against technical XAI, according to which the detection and interpretation of algorithmic bias can be handled more or less independently by technical experts who specialize in XAI methods. Drawing on resources from feminist epistemology, we show why technical XAI is mistaken. Specifically, we demonstrate that the proper detection of algorithmic bias requires relevant interpretive resources, which can only be made available, in practice, by actively involving a diverse group of stakeholders. Finally, we suggest how feminist theories can help shape integrated XAI: an inclusive social-epistemic process that facilitates the amelioration of algorithmic bias.
Value alignment is essential for ensuring that AI systems act in ways that are consistent with human values. Existing approaches, such as reinforcement learning with human feedback and constitutional AI, however, exhibit power asymmetries and lack transparency. These “authoritarian” approaches fail to adequately accommodate a broad array of human opinions, raising concerns about whose values are being prioritized. In response, we introduce the Dynamic Value Alignment approach, theoretically grounded in the principles of parallel constraint satisfaction, which models moral reasoning as a dynamic process that balances multiple value principles. Our approach also enhances users’ moral and epistemic agency by granting users greater control over the values that influence AI behavior. As a more user-centric, transparent, and participatory framework for AI ethics, our approach not only addresses the democratic deficits inherent in current practices but also ensures that AI systems are flexibly aligned with a diverse array of human values.
Generative models, with their ability to create new data, have significantly advanced machine learning. However, these models can also produce biased outputs, threatening representational fairness. Current literature mainly addresses biases in synthetic data that amplify social biases, such as racial and gender stereotypes, alongside underrepresentation and misrepresentation. In this paper, we argue for the existence of previously unexplored biases that generative models can produce on a massive scale. Using Generative Adversarial Networks as a case study, we show that these unexpected and hard to interpret biases can systematically marginalize and denigrate minoritized communities. Importantly, these biases are not merely a reflection of human biases in the training data but a consequence of machine learning processes that diverge from the human perspective. We contend that current debiasing strategies are inadequate, as they fail to fully grasp the epistemic challenges and underestimate the moral risks of generative models. We conclude by suggesting a novel direction to ameliorate their harm.