John P. Dickerson

John P. Dickerson

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John P. Dickerson

University of Maryland College Park MD USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 October 2024 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SVSahil Verma
Sahil Verma
VBVarich Boonsanong
Varich Boonsanong
MHMinh Hoang
Minh Hoang
KHKeegan Hines
Keegan Hines
JDJohn Dickerson
John Dickerson
CSChirag Shah
Chirag Shah
Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this article, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations , a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

1 April 2019 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JDJohn P. Dickerson
John P. Dickerson
APAriel D. Procaccia
Ariel D. Procaccia
TSTuomas Sandholm
Tuomas Sandholm
Algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not typically result in an actual transplant. We address the problem of cycles and chains in proposed matches failing after the matching algorithm has committed to them. We show that failure-aware kidney exchange can significantly increase the expected number of lives saved (i) in theory, on random graph models; (ii) on real data from kidney exchange match runs between 2010 and 2014; and (iii) on synthetic data generated via a model of dynamic kidney exchange. This gain is robust to uncertainty over the true underlying failure rate. We design a branch-and-price–based optimal clearing algorithm specifically for the probabilistic exchange clearing problem and show that this new solver scales well on large simulated data, unlike prior clearing algorithms. Finally, we show that failure-aware matching can increase overall system efficiency and simultaneously increase the expected number of transplants to highly sensitized patients, in both static and dynamic models. This paper was accepted by Yinyu Ye, optimization.

1 January 2020 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ABAvrim Blum
Avrim Blum
JDJohn P. Dickerson
John P. Dickerson
NHNika Haghtalab
Nika Haghtalab
APAriel D. Procaccia
Ariel D. Procaccia
TSTuomas Sandholm
Tuomas Sandholm
ASAnkit Sharma
Ankit Sharma
We study the stochastic matching problem with the goal of finding a maximum matching in a graph whose edges are unknown but can be accessed via queries. This is a special case of stochastic k-cycle packing, in which the problem is to find a maximum packing of cycles, each of which exists with some probability. We provide polynomial-time adaptive and nonadaptive algorithms that provably yield a near-optimal solution, using a number of edge queries that is linear in the number of vertices. We are especially interested in kidney exchange, with which pairs of patients with end-stage renal failure and their willing but incompatible donors participate in a mechanism that performs compatibility tests between patients and donors and swaps the donors of some patients so that a large number of patients receive compatible kidneys. Because of the significant cost of performing compatibility tests, currently, kidney exchange programs perform at most one compatibility test per patient. Our theoretical results applied to kidney exchange show that, by increasing the number of compatibility tests performed per patient from one to a larger constant, we effectively get the full benefit of exhaustive testing at a fraction of the cost. We show, on both generated and real data from the UNOS nationwide kidney exchange, that even a small number of nonadaptive edge queries per vertex results in large gains in expected successful matches.

1 August 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
MCMichael Curry
Michael Curry
TSTuomas Sandholm
Tuomas Sandholm
JDJohn Dickerson
John Dickerson
A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. The ideal auction architecture for differentiable economics would be perfectly strategyproof, support multiple bidders and items, and be rich enough to represent the optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing) mechanism. So far, such an architecture does not exist. There are single-bidder approaches (MenuNet, RochetNet) which are always strategyproof and can represent optimal mechanisms. RegretNet is multi-bidder and can approximate any mechanism, but is only approximately strategyproof. We present an architecture that supports multiple bidders and is perfectly strategyproof, but cannot necessarily represent the optimal mechanism. This architecture is the classic affine maximizer auction (AMA), modified to offer lotteries. By using the gradient-based optimization tools of differentiable economics, we can now train lottery AMAs, competing with or outperforming prior approaches in revenue.

8 August 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VCValeriia Cherepanova
Valeriia Cherepanova
SRSteven Reich
Steven Reich
SDSamuel Dooley
Samuel Dooley
HSHossein Souri
Hossein Souri
JDJohn Dickerson
John Dickerson
TGTom Goldstein
Tom Goldstein

7 February 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VNVedant Nanda
Vedant Nanda
PXPan Xu
Pan Xu
KSKarthik Abinav Sankararaman
Karthik Abinav Sankararaman
JDJohn P. Dickerson
John P. Dickerson
ASAravind Srinivasan
Aravind Srinivasan
Rideshare platforms, when assigning requests to drivers, tend to maximize profit for the system and/or minimize waiting time for riders. Such platforms can exacerbate biases that drivers may have over certain types of requests. We consider the case of peak hours when the demand for rides is more than the supply of drivers. Drivers are well aware of their advantage during the peak hours and can choose to be selective about which rides to accept. Moreover, if in such a scenario, the assignment of requests to drivers (by the platform) is made only to maximize profit and/or minimize wait time for riders, requests of a certain type (e.g., from a non-popular pickup location, or to a non-popular drop-off location) might never be assigned to a driver. Such a system can be highly unfair to riders. However, increasing fairness might come at a cost of the overall profit made by the rideshare platform. To balance these conflicting goals, we present a flexible, non-adaptive algorithm, NAdap, that allows the platform designer to control the profit and fairness of the system via parameters α and β respectively.We model the matching problem as an online bipartite matching where the set of drivers is offline and requests arrive online. Upon the arrival of a request, we use NAdap to assign it to a driver (the driver might then choose to accept or reject it) or reject the request. We formalize the measures of profit and fairness in our setting and show that by using NAdap, the competitive ratios for profit and fairness measures would be no worse than α/e and β/e respectively. Extensive experimental results on both real-world and synthetic datasets confirm the validity of our theoretical lower bounds. Additionally, they show that NAdap under some choice of (α, β) can beat two natural heuristics, Greedy and Uniform, on both fairness and profit. Code is available at: https://github.com/nvedant07/rideshare-fairness-peak/. Full paper can be found in the proceedings of AAAI 2020 and on ArXiv: http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.08388).