Dane M. Christensen

Dane M. Christensen

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Dane M. Christensen

Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 April 2021 in The Accounting Review
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DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
GSGeorge Serafeim
George Serafeim
ASAnywhere Sikochi
Anywhere Sikochi
Despite the rising use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, there is substantial disagreement across rating agencies regarding what rating to give to individual firms. As what drives this disagreement is unclear, we examine whether a firm's ESG disclosure helps explain some of this disagreement. We predict and find that greater ESG disclosure actually leads to greater ESG rating disagreement. These findings hold using firm fixed effects and using a difference-in-differences design with mandatory ESG disclosure shocks. We also find that raters disagree more about ESG outcome metrics than input metrics (policies), and that disclosure appears to amplify disagreement more for outcomes. Last, we examine consequences of ESG disagreement and find that greater ESG disagreement is associated with higher return volatility, larger absolute price movements, and a lower likelihood of issuing external financing. Overall, our findings highlight that ESG disclosure generally exacerbates ESG rating disagreement rather than resolves it. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; M14; M41; Q56.

15 July 2014 in Strategic Management Journal
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DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
DDDan S. Dhaliwal
Dan S. Dhaliwal
SBSteven Boivie
Steven Boivie
SGScott D. Graffin
Scott D. Graffin

1 July 2015 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
I investigate whether corporate accountability reporting helps protect firm value. Specifically, I examine (1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (e.g., bribery, kickbacks, discrimination), and (2) whether prior corporate accountability reporting reduces the negative stock price reaction when high-profile misconduct does occur. Using multiple methods to address self-selection, I find that, on average, firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms to manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which, in turn, influences expected punishments.

20 March 2017 in Strategic Management Journal
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THTimothy D. Hubbard
Timothy D. Hubbard
DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
SGScott D. Graffin
Scott D. Graffin

3 November 2017 in Contemporary Accounting Research
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DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
KJKeith L. Jones
Keith L. Jones
DKDavid G. Kenchington
David G. Kenchington

10 September 2021 in Review of Accounting Studies
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Journal Article
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DCDane M. Christensen
Dane M. Christensen
DKDavid G. Kenchington
David G. Kenchington
RLRick C. Laux
Rick C. Laux