Tomás Lejarraga

Tomás Lejarraga

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Tomás Lejarraga

Department of Business Economics, University of the Balearic Islands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 October 2015 in Current Directions in Psychological Science
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Journal Article
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RHRobin M. Hogarth
Robin M. Hogarth
TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
ESEmre Soyer
Emre Soyer
Inference involves two settings: In the first, information is acquired (learning); in the second, it is applied (predictions or choices). Kind learning environments involve close matches between the informational elements in the two settings and are a necessary condition for accurate inferences. Wicked learning environments involve mismatches. This conceptual framework facilitates identifying sources of inferential errors and can be used, among other things, to suggest how to target corrective procedures. For example, structuring learning environments to be kind improves probabilistic judgments. Potentially, it could also enable economic agents to exhibit maximizing behavior.

1 November 2011 in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
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Journal Article
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TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
CGCleotilde Gonzalez
Cleotilde Gonzalez

2 December 2010 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
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Journal Article
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TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
VDVarun Dutt
Varun Dutt
CGCleotilde Gonzalez
Cleotilde Gonzalez

1 September 2012 in Cognition
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Journal Article
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TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
RHRalph Hertwig
Ralph Hertwig
CGCleotilde Gonzalez
Cleotilde Gonzalez

1 June 2021 in Psychological Bulletin
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Journal Article
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TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
RHRalph Hertwig
Ralph Hertwig
Within just 7 years, behavioral decision research in psychology underwent a dramatic change: In 1967, Peterson and Beach (1967) reviewed more than 160 experiments concerned with people's statistical intuitions. Invoking the metaphor of the mind as an intuitive statistician, they concluded that "probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models that integrate and account for human performance in a wide range of inferential tasks" (p. 29). Yet in a 1974 Science article, Tversky and Kahneman rejected this conclusion, arguing that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations" (p. 1124). With that, they introduced the heuristics-and-biases research program, which has profoundly altered how psychology, and the behavioral sciences more generally, view the mind's competences and rationality. How was this radical transformation possible? We examine a previously neglected driver: The heuristics-and-biases program established an experimental protocol in behavioral decision research that relied on described scenarios rather than learning and experience. We demonstrate this shift with an analysis of 604 experiments, which shows that the descriptive protocol has dominated post-1974 research. Specifically, we examine two lines of research addressed in the intuitive-statistician program (Bayesian reasoning and judgments of compound events) and two lines of research spurred by the heuristics-and-biases program (framing and anchoring and adjustment). We conclude that the focus on description at the expense of learning has profoundly shaped the influential view of the error-proneness of human cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

17 April 2015 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
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Journal Article
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TLTomás Lejarraga
Tomás Lejarraga
TPThorsten Pachur
Thorsten Pachur
RFRenato Frey
Renato Frey
RHRalph Hertwig
Ralph Hertwig