Antonia Affinito

Antonia Affinito

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Antonia Affinito

University of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 October 2023 in Journal of Information Security and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAntonia Affinito
Antonia Affinito
SZStefania Zinno
Stefania Zinno
GSGiovanni Stanco
Giovanni Stanco
Alessio BottaAlessio Botta
Alessio Botta
GVGiorgio Ventre
Giorgio Ventre

4 November 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RSRaffaele Sommese
Raffaele Sommese
GAGautam Akiwate
Gautam Akiwate
AAAntonia Affinito
Antonia Affinito
MMMoritz Muller
Moritz Muller
MJMattijs Jonker
Mattijs Jonker
KCKc Claffy
Kc Claffy
Malicious actors exploit the DNS namespace to launch spam campaigns, phishing attacks, malware, and other harmful activities. Combating these threats requires visibility into domain existence, ownership and nameservice activity that the DNS protocol does not itself provide. To facilitate visibility and security-related study of the expanding gTLD namespace, ICANN introduced the Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS) that shares daily zone file snapshots of new gTLD zones. However, a remarkably high concentration of malicious activity is associated with domains that do not live long enough make it into these daily snapshots. Using public and private sources of newly observed domains, we discover that even with the best available data there is a considerable visibility gap in detecting short-lived domains. We find that the daily snapshots miss at least 1% of newly registered and short-lived domains, which are frequently registered with likely malicious intent. In reducing this critical visibility gap using public sources of data, we demonstrate how more timely access to TLD zone changes can provide valuable data to better prevent abuse. We hope that this work sparks a discussion in the community on how to effectively and safely revive the concept of sharing Rapid Zone Updates for security research. Finally, we release a public live feed of newly registered domains, with the aim of enabling further research in abuse identification.