8 April 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This study examines the impact of judicial delocalization on corporate tax avoidance by exploiting the staggered establishment of cross-provincial Circuit Tribunals in China as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that judicial delocalization significantly reduces corporate tax avoidance, with the effect concentrated among firms lacking political connections. The channel analyses indicates that the reform imposes a binding enforcement discipline on financially constrained firms by strengthening judicial credibility and substitute weak local governance arrangements. Additionally, we also find that the deterrent effect of the reform is more pronounced for firms that were more embedded in local protectionist environments prior to the reform, including older firms and firms with longer operating cycles. Our study highlights the importance of the spatial organization of judicial authority in shaping enforcement credibility and provides new evidence that judicial delocalization can serve as an effective institutional mechanism for curbing corporate tax avoidance in emerging economies.
21 July 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This study examines the impact of judicial delocalization on corporate tax avoidance by exploiting the staggered establishment of cross-provincial Circuit Tribunals in China as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that judicial delocalization significantly reduces corporate tax avoidance, with the effect concentrated among firms lacking political connections. The channel analyses indicates that the reform imposes a binding enforcement discipline on financially constrained firms by strengthening judicial credibility and substitute weak local governance arrangements. Additionally, we also find that the deterrent effect of the reform is more pronounced for firms that were more embedded in local protectionist environments prior to the reform, including older firms and firms with longer operating cycles. Our study highlights the importance of the spatial organization of judicial authority in shaping enforcement credibility and provides new evidence that judicial delocalization can serve as an effective institutional mechanism for curbing corporate tax avoidance in emerging economies.