Corrado Matta

Corrado Matta

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Corrado Matta

Department of Education, Faculty of Social Sciences, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 July 2021 in Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta
In this paper, I discuss and critically assess how the relationship between philosophy of science and qualitative methods is presented and discussed in research on qualitative research methods education (QRME) and qualitative methods textbooks. I argue that both typically convey the idea that philosophy of science guides or influences the use and choice of qualitative methods but are often unclear about how this influence works. I propose two conceptualizations of the relationship between philosophy of science and qualitative methods: philosophical assumptions can either explicate or explain qualitative methods. I argue that both approaches have pedagogical rewards, but that whereas the explanation approach is explicitly or implicitly used in many examples of research on QRME and textbooks, the explication approach has not had wide application. I conclude by arguing that the lack of clarity and the absence of discussion about explication are potential problems for qualitative research methods education.

25 July 2019 in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta
This article discusses the concept of evidential reasoning in the context of qualitative research methods in the social sciences. A conceptualization of qualitative evidential reasoning is proposed. This conceptualization is based on the analysis of an example of qualitative methods applied to the study of music education. I argue that this conceptualization identifies specific and nontrivial conditions for qualitative evidential reasoning and, at the same time, supports the claim that there is no essential methodological separation regarding evidence between quantitative and qualitative methods.

22 June 2020 in Educational Philosophy and Theory
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and critically assess the evidential relationship between neuroscience and educational practice. To do this, I reconstruct a standard way in which evidence from neuroscience is used to support recommendations about educational practice, that is, testing pedagogical interventions using neuroimaging methods, and discuss and critically assess the inference behind this approach. I argue that this inference rests on problematic assumptions, and, therefore, that neuroimaging intervention studies have no special evidential status for basing educational practice. I conclude arguing that these limitations could be resolved by integrating evidence from neurocognitive and educational science.

29 July 2015 in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta
This article criticizes a view about the interpretation of human action, labeled in the text as interpretivism. This view posits a sharp separation between the natural and social sciences, to the effect that the methods of the latter cannot be applied to the former. I criticize this standpoint by reconstructing a case of educational research. As I argue, the case I analyze indicates that the arguments in support of interpretivism are contradicted by what social researchers can actually achieve. I conclude that the interpretivistic claims lack support and that the general separation claim appears as problematic.

30 September 2022 in Pedagogisk forskning i Sverige
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta

1 January 2014 in Open Review of Educational Research
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CMCorrado Matta
Corrado Matta
In this article I examine three examples of philosophical theories of scientific representation with the aim of assessing which of these is a good candidate for a philosophical theory of scientific representation in science learning. The three candidate theories are Giere's intentional approach, Suárez's inferential approach and Lynch and Woolgar's sociological approach. In order to assess which theory is more promising, I will compare the three candidate theories to two aspects of scientific representation in science learning that emerge from empirical research on science learning. I label these aspects as the intentional and normative character of scientific representation in science learning. As I argue, whereas the other competing accounts of scientific representation can only capture one of the two aspects highlighted in this article, the inferential conception has the capacity to capture them both in a coherent way. Thus, I conclude that the inferential conception seems to be a fruitful philosophical theory of scientific representation in science learning.