Nima Alizadeh-Basban

Nima Alizadeh-Basban

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Nima Alizadeh-Basban


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2019 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ATAta Allah Taleizadeh
Ata Allah Taleizadeh
NANima Alizadeh-Basban
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
SNS.T.A. Niaki
S.T.A. Niaki

1 October 2018 in Computers & Industrial Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ATAta Allah Taleizadeh
Ata Allah Taleizadeh
NANima Alizadeh-Basban
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
BSBhaba R. Sarker
Bhaba R. Sarker

1 March 2020 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NANima Alizadeh-Basban
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
ATAta Allah Taleizadeh
Ata Allah Taleizadeh

1 September 2019 in Computers & Industrial Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TJTaher Javadi
Taher Javadi
NANima Alizadeh-Basban
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
Sobhan AsianSobhan Asian
Sobhan Asian
AHAshkan Hafezalkotob
Ashkan Hafezalkotob

2 March 2021 in RAIRO - Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ATAta Allah Taleizadeh
Ata Allah Taleizadeh
SNS.T.A. Niaki
S.T.A. Niaki
NANima Alizadeh-Basban
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
The high competition in today’s market persuaded companies to provide some attractive options for products to obtain more market shares. Therefore, in this research, three motivating elements are devised in the framework of a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a distributor under stochastic demand, where green production via carbon abatement, quality enhancement efforts, and returning and remanufacturing policies are used. In line with reducing carbon emission two possibilities are applied in this paper involving the green technologies investment and the trade and cap policy. As simultaneous consideration of all motivating factors raises conflicts between the members in terms of undertaking the costs, a cooperative supply chain, as well as a cost-sharing (CS) contract in non-cooperative form, is devised to alleviate the conflicts and boost the performance of the supply chain. In order to find the optimal decision variables and profits in the CS contract, two game-theoretical approaches, namely Nash and Stackelberg, are applied. The results present the sufficiently of both the cooperative chain and the CS contact. In addition, the analysis of parameters in the CS contract in Stackelberg game indicates that when the distributor undertakes a part of the costs, positive impacts on the other motivating factors are observed. However, there is no interaction among the motivating factors in the Nash game.