28 October 2014 in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is “no,” then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is “yes” and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.
12 January 2022 in Ecology and Evolution
Kelp forests are in decline across much of their range due to place‐specific combinations of local and global stressors. Declines in kelp abundance can lead to cascading losses of biodiversity and productivity with far‐reaching ecological and socioeconomic consequences. The Salish Sea is a hotspot of kelp diversity where many species of kelp provide critical habitat and food for commercially, ecologically, and culturally important fish and invertebrate species. However, like other regions, kelp forests in much of the Salish Sea are in rapid decline. Data gaps and limited long‐term monitoring have hampered attempts to identify and manage for specific drivers of decline, despite the documented urgency to protect these important habitats. To address these knowledge gaps, we gathered a focus group of experts on kelp in the Salish Sea to identify perceived direct and indirect stressors facing kelp forests. We then conducted a comprehensive literature review of peer‐reviewed studies from the Salish Sea and temperate coastal ecosystems worldwide to assess the level of support for the pathways identified by the experts, and we identified knowledge gaps to prioritize future research. Our results revealed major research gaps within the Salish Sea and highlighted the potential to use expert knowledge for making informed decisions in the region. We found high support for the pathways in the global literature, with variable consensus on the relationship between stressors and responses across studies, confirming the influence of local ecological, oceanographic, and anthropogenic contexts and threshold effects on stressor–response relationships. Finally, we prioritized areas for future research in the Salish Sea. This study demonstrates the value expert opinion has to inform management decisions. These methods are readily adaptable to other ecosystem management contexts, and the results of this case study can be immediately applied to kelp management.
14 October 2020 in American Anthropologist
Experimental economic games are an increasingly common component of the anthropological tool kit. Yet their external validity continues to be a point of debate and active empirical investigation within economics and anthropology. I review and reorganize central concepts within the experimental economic game literature on external validity and find that—consistent with anthropological assumptions of cultural variability—game results are not reliably generalizable across different participants or contexts. However, whether or not game behavior parallels real‐world behavior within the same participants or contexts remains an open question. Methodological diversity is a strength of anthropology as a discipline, and therefore anthropologists are well poised to design more effective tests of parallelism in the future. In the meantime, anthropologists borrowing experimental methods from economics should treat the relationship between behavior inside and outside of games as an open empirical question. They should also carefully consider whether the method is consistent with their theoretical assumptions and research goals. [experimental economic games, external validity, generalizability, parallelism, anthropological methods]
3 June 2022 in Global Perspectives
MMMonique Borgerhoff Mulder
Monique Borgerhoff Mulder
Does resource extraction during experimental economic games reflect resource use and behavior in other contexts? This question about external validity is central to determining the inferences that can be drawn from experimental evidence to broader sets of circumstances. Building on previous studies of external validity, which often raise concerns about the generalizability of experimental economic games to other contexts, we instead highlight parallelism between behavior inside and outside of games and its implications for applied research. Here we present the results from a framed multiphase common-pool resource game played with fishermen from a fishing community in Baja California Sur to explore the associations between game play and both self-reported and observed behavioral measures. Participants played an experimental economic game that incorporated both fisheries-specific resource dynamics and the current policy context of local fisheries management. Game administration followed two years of interviews, participant observation, and household surveys in the community. In addition to providing an in-depth understanding of the broader social-ecological context, this allowed us to compare similar game, self-reported, and observed behaviors for the same individuals. Overall, we found little evidence for external validity in terms of parallelism. None of the tests for association between fishing behaviors in the game and survey met the study-wide significance threshold. Only one association—between game behavior and conservation values—was significant at the single-test level. Based on our results, we caution against relying solely on experimental economic games as proxies for behaviors regarding resource use when developing policies. Collecting multiple or iterative measures of behavior using mixed methods is a necessary precaution, especially if the goal is to make specific policy recommendations.
22 July 2023 in Marine Policy