30 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
The fabless business model has given rise to many security threats, including piracy of intellectual property (IP), overproduction, counterfeiting, reverse engineering (RE), and hardware Trojans (HT). Such threats severely undermine the benefits of the fabless model. Among the countermeasures developed to thwart piracy and RE attacks, logic locking has emerged as a promising and versatile solution that is being adopted by both academia and industry. The idea behind logic locking is to lock the design using a “keying” mechanism; only the rightful owner has control over the locked design. Therefore, the design remains nonfunctional without the knowledge of the key. In this article, we survey the evolution of logic locking over the last decade. We introduce various “cat-and-mouse” games involved in logic locking along with its novel applications—including, processor pipelines, graphics processing units (GPUs), and analog circuits. We aim this article to be a primer for researchers interested in developing new logic-locking techniques and employing logic locking in different application domains.
8 February 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Differential fault analysis of stream ciphers, such as Grain (Grain v1 and Grain-128) has been an active area of research. Several countermeasures to thwart such analysis have been also proposed in the related cryptographic literature. In this paper, we demonstrate a novel combination of power and fault analysis strategies to devise attacks against such protected implementations of Grain stream cipher. We considered clock glitch induced faults occurring in practice to construct our fault model. In addition, we developed a generic power analysis attack technique against the Grain family of stream ciphers assuming that the cipher implementation can be resynchronized multiple times with a fixed secret key and any randomly generated initialization vector. Subsequently, we combine our proposed power analysis strategy with the notion of the practically occurring faults to mount attacks on various fault attack countermeasures. In order to validate our proposed power analysis attack, we report the results of power trace classifications of a Grain v1 implementation on SASEBO-GII board. The captured power traces were analyzed using least squares support vector machine learning algorithm-based multiclass classifiers to segregate the power traces into the respective Hamming distance (HD) classes. To extract power samples with high information about HD classes, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) metric was chosen for feature selection. The experimental results of power trace classifications of test set showed success rate as high as 92.5% when the seven largest SNR sample instants over a clock cycle were chosen as features along with a suitable kernel hyperparameter combination.
13 July 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
In order to enhance the security of logic obfuscation schemes, delay locking has been proposed in combination with traditional functional logic locking approaches. A circuit obfuscated using this approach preserves the original functionality only when both correct functional and delay keys are provided. In this paper, we develop a novel SAT formulation based attack approach called TimingSAT to deobfuscate the functionalities of such delay locked designs. The proposed technique models the timing characteristics of various types of gates present in a design as Boolean functions to build a timing profile embedded SAT formulation in terms of targeted key inputs. TimingSAT attack works in two stages: In the first stage the functional key is found using conventional SAT attack approach and in the second stage the delay key is determined using the aforementioned timing profile embedded SAT formulation of the circuit. In both stages of the attack, wrong keys are iteratively eliminated till a key belonging to the correct equivalence class is obtained. We perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed TimingSAT attack to break delay-locked benchmarks within a few hours. Subsequently, we propose a countermeasure called stripped-functionality delay locking (SFDL) which not only thwarts TimingSAT attack but also resists all known attacks against logic obfuscation. SFDL combines the concept of delay locking with stripped-functionality based logic locking approach to realize an effective IP security solution for hardware designs. Unlike existing logic locking schemes, SFDL simultaneously achieves strong SAT attack resiliency as well as significantly high output corruptibility.
1 September 2016 in IET Information Security
Hardware implementations of the well‐known Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm have been shown to be vulnerable to power and fault analysis (FA) attacks. To implement protected designs of RSA‐Chinese remainder theorem in embedded devices, like smart cards or RFIDs, the one needs to find solutions which require less computations as well as incurs low storage overheads. One such efficient scheme was proposed by Joye et al . in CHES'02 and it was claimed to be secure against both simple power analysis (SPA) and FA attacks. In this study, the authors demonstrate a template attack (TA) against Joye's countermeasure and show that the scheme can be broken with a low number of power traces. In addition, the authors report the experimental results of the proposed attack against an implementation of Joye's scheme on a Xilinx Microblaze soft‐core processor of SASEBO‐W standard side‐channel analysis board. The authors used least squares support vector machine (LS‐SVM) based binary classifiers to analyse the collected power traces. The authors also describe the potential threat posed by cache timing attacks on Joye's ladder in presence of a concurrently running spy process and outline a probable countermeasure to the posed attacks.