Timothy Dee

Timothy Dee

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Timothy Dee

Electrical & Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, 1177 Ames, Iowa, United States

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
TDTimothy Dee
Timothy Dee
IRIan Richardson
Ian Richardson
Akhilesh TyagiAkhilesh Tyagi
Akhilesh Tyagi
Mobile banking, shopping, and in-app purchases utilize persistent authentication states for access to sensitive data. One-shot authentication permits access for a fixed time period. For instance, a [user name, password] based authentication allows a user access to all the shopping and payments data in the Amazon shopping app. Traditional user passwords and lock screens are easily compromised. Snooping attacks - observing an unsuspecting user entering passwords - and Smudge attacks - examining touchscreen finger oil residue - enable compromised user authentication. Mobile device interactions provide robust human and device identity data. Such biometrics enhance authentication. Behavioral attributes during information input constitute the password. Adversary password reproduction difficulty increases since pure observation is insufficient. Current mobile continuous authentication schemes use, among others, touchscreen swipe interactions or keyboard input timing. Many of these methods require cumbersome training or intrusive authentication. Software keyboard interactions provide a consistent biometric data stream. We develop biometric profiles using touch pressure, location, and timing. New interactions authenticate against a profile using a distance metric. Classification achieves 100% accuracy in 3840.33 milliseconds on Nexus 7 tablets.

4 November 2020 in IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TDTimothy Dee
Timothy Dee
Akhilesh TyagiAkhilesh Tyagi
Akhilesh Tyagi
Existing vehicles and emerging smart vehicles organize their architecture around a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Control messages with commands from one component cause another component to take an action. If a control message and action resulting from it is recorded by an adversary, it might be replayed for the same action. A connected smart vehicle is vulnerable to new attack vectors originating from other systems within a smart community. Existing CAN protocol does not offer prevent replay attacks. We develop a secure CAN protocol. A shared secret between nodes allows for confidential and authenticated messages. Use of a freshness value and keyed hash offer message integrity and staleness prevention. The distributed (centralized) bandwidth of $958.5$ (934.3125) Kb/sec compares favorably with the CAN protocol. Base CAN-FD protocol without any security achieves 9.8% higher bandwidth than the distributed secure CAN.

2 July 2020 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TDTimothy Dee
Timothy Dee
RSRyan Scheel
Ryan Scheel
NMNicholas Montelibano
Nicholas Montelibano
Akhilesh TyagiAkhilesh Tyagi
Akhilesh Tyagi