Dov M. Gabbay

Dov M. Gabbay

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Dov M. Gabbay

Imperial College

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Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 1994 in Journal of Automated Reasoning
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MDMarcello D'agostino
Marcello D'agostino
DGDov M. Gabbay
Dov M. Gabbay

1 December 1996 in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
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DGD. M. Gabbay
D. M. Gabbay
This is Part 1 of a paper on fibred semantics and combination of logics. It aims to present a methodology for combining arbitrary logical systemsLi,i∈I, to form a new systemLI. The methodology ‘fibres’ the semanticsiofLiinto a semantics forLI, and ‘weaves’ the proof theory (axiomatics) ofLiinto a proof system ofLI. There are various ways of doing this, we distinguish by different names such as ‘fibring’, ‘dovetailing’ etc, yielding different systems, denoted byetc. Once the logics are ‘weaved’, further ‘interaction’ axioms can be geometrically motivated and added, and then systematically studied. The methodology is general and is applied to modal and intuitionistic logics as well as to general algebraic logics. We obtain general results on bulk, in the sense that we develop standard combining techniques and refinements which can be applied to any family of initial logics to obtain further combined logics.The main results of this paper is a construction for combining arbitrary, (possibly not normal) modal or intermediate logics, each complete for a class of (not necessarily frame) Kripke models. We show transfer of recursive axiomatisability, decidability and finite model property.Some results on combining logics (normal modal extensions ofK) have recently been introduced by Kracht and Wolter, Goranko and Passy and by Fine and Schurz as well as a multitude of special combined systems existing in the literature of the past 20–30 years. We hope our methodology will help organise the field systematically.

1 December 1992 in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
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DGDov M. Gabbay
Dov M. Gabbay
RQRuy J. G. B. de Queiroz
Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz
The so-called Curry-Howard interpretation (Curry [1934], Curry and Feys [1958], Howard [1969], Tait [1965]) is known to provide a rather neat term-functional account of intuitionistic implication. Could one refine the interpretation to obtain an almost as good account of other neighbouring implications, including the so-called ‘resource’ implications (e.g. linear, relevant, etc.)?We answer this question positively by demonstrating that just by working with side conditions on the rule of assertability conditions for the connective representing implication (‘→’) one can characterise those ‘resource’ logics. The idea stems from the realisation that whereas the elimination rule for conditionals (of which implication is a particular case) remains virtually unchanged no matter what kind of conditional one has (i.e. linear, relevant, intuitionistic, classical, etc., all have modus ponens), the corresponding introduction rule carries an element of vagueness which can be explored in the characterisation of several sorts of conditionals. The rule of →-introduction is classified as an ‘improper’ inference rule, to use a terminology from Prawitz [1965]. Now, the so-called improper rules leave room for manoeuvre as to how a particular logic can be obtained just by imposing conditions on the discharge of assumptions that would correspond to the particular logical discipline one is adopting (linear, relevant, ticket entailment, intuitionistic, classical, etc.). The side conditions can be ‘naturally’ imposed, given that a degree of ‘vagueness’ is introduced by the presentation of those improper inference rules, such as the rule of →-introduction: which says: starting from assumption ‘A’, and arriving at ‘B’ via an unspecified number of steps, one can discharge the assumption and conclude that ‘A’ implies ‘B’.

1 September 1993 in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
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DGD. M. Gabbay
D. M. Gabbay
VSV. B. Shehtman
V. B. Shehtman
The interest in fragments of predicate logics is motivated by the well-known fact that full classical predicate calculus is undecidable (cf. Church [1936]). So it is desirable to find decidable fragments which are in some sense “maximal”, i.e., which become undecidable if they are “slightly” extended. Or, alternatively, we can look for “minimal” undecidable fragments and try to identify the vague boundary between decidability and undecidability. A great deal of work in this area concerning mainly classical logic has been done since the thirties. We will not give a complete review of decidability and undecidability results in classical logic, referring the reader to existing monographs (cf. Suranyi [1959], Lewis [1979], and Dreben, Goldfarb [1979]). A short summary can also be found in the well-known book Church [1956]. Let us recall only several facts. Herein we will consider only logics without functional symbols, constants, and equality.(C1) The fragment of the classical logic with only monadic predicate letters is decidable (cf. Behmann [1922]).(C2) The fragment of the classical logic with a single binary predicate letter is undecidable. (This is a consequence of Gödel [1933].)(C3) The fragment of the classical logic with a single individual variable is decidable; in fact it is equivalent to Lewis S5 (cf. Wajsberg [1933]).(C4) The fragment of the classical logic with two individual variables is decidable (Segerberg [1973] contains a proof using modal logic; Scott [1962] and Mortimer [1975] give traditional proofs.)(C5) The fragment of the classical logic with three individual variables and binary predicate letters is undecidable (cf. Surańyi [1943]). In fact this paper considers formulas of the following type φ,ψ being quantifier-free and the set of binary predicate letters which can appear in φ or ψ being fixed and finite.