Xuewei Feng

Xuewei Feng

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Xuewei Feng

Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2021 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
QLQi Li
Qi Li
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
CFChuanpu Fu
Chuanpu Fu
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu
In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack that can be used to terminate victim TCP connections or inject forged data into victim TCP connections by manipulating the new mixed IPID assignment method, which is widely used in Linux kernel version 4.18 and beyond. Our attack has three steps. First, an off-path attacker can downgrade the IPID assignment for TCP packets from the more secure per-socket-based policy to the less secure hash-based policy, thus building a shared IPID counter that forms a side channel in the victim. Second, the attacker detects the presence of TCP connections by observing the side channel of the shared IPID counter. Third, the attacker infers sequence and acknowledgment numbers of the detected connection by observing the side channel. Consequently, the attacker can completely hijack the connection, e.g., resetting the connection or poisoning the data stream. We evaluate the impacts of our attack in the real world, and we uncover that more than 20% of Alexa top 100k websites are vulnerable to our attack. Our case studies of SSH DoS, manipulating web traffic, and poisoning BGP routing tables show its threat on a wide range of applications. Moreover, we demonstrate that our attack can be further extended to exploit IPv4/IPv6 dual-stack networks on increasing the hash collisions and enlarging vulnerable populations. Finally, we analyze the root cause and develop a new IPID assignment method to defeat this attack. We prototype our defense in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness in the real world.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XCXijia Che
Xijia Che
YHYi He
Yi He
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a short-range wireless communication technology for resource-constrained IoT devices. Unfortunately, BLE is vulnerable to session-based attacks, where previous packets construct exploitable conditions for subsequent packets to compromise connections. Defending against session-based attacks is challenging because each step in the attack sequence is legitimate when inspected individually. In this paper, we present BlueSWAT, a lightweight state-aware security framework for protecting BLE devices. To perform inspection on the session level rather than individual packets, BlueSWAT leverages a finite state machine (FSM) to monitor sequential actions of connections at runtime. Patterns of session-based attacks are modeled as malicious transition paths in the FSM. To overcome the heterogeneous IoT environment, we develop a lightweight eBPF framework to facilitate universal patch distribution across different BLE architectures and stacks, without requiring device reboot. We implement BlueSWAT on 5 real-world devices with different chips and stacks to demonstrate its cross-device adaptability. On our dataset with 101 real-world BLE vulnerabilities, BlueSWAT can mitigate 76.1% of session-based attacks, outperforming other defense frameworks. In our end-to-end application evaluation, BlueSWAT introduces an average of 0.073% memory overhead and negligible latency.

21 February 2025 in Communications of the ACM
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
QLQi Li
Qi Li
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu
JWJianping Wu
Jianping Wu

22 April 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SFSongtao Fu
Songtao Fu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
XWXiaoliang Wang
Xiaoliang Wang
SYSu Yao
Su Yao
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu
Secure data forwarding is critical for users to meet their requirements. In this paper, we propose D3 (Demon Detector in Data Plane), a source-driven, secure fault localization mechanism, which empowers the source to localize faulty link in Path Aware Networking, thus circumventing faulty link to guarantee secure data forwarding. D3 utilizes the source to instruct the on-path routers, thus empowering it to detect whether the on-path routers forward the packet as expected. Compared with existing schemes that are difficult to be deployed in practice due to the heavy storage, computation, and communication overhead, D3 offloads most of the on-path router's storage and computation overhead, thus dramatically improving the deployment efficiency. Particularly, the length of the additional packet header in D3 is 2-5 times less than the state-of-the-art mechanisms, thus having a low communication overhead. Besides that, the destination in D3 could keep stateless processing, thus having backward compatibility and eliminating the opportunity for DoS attacks toward a stateful destination. The BMv2 and Barefoot Tofino hardware evaluations show that D3 could achieve high fault localization accuracy and process the packet at line rate.

26 February 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HLHaibin Li
Haibin Li
QLQi Li
Qi Li
YSYingying Su
Yingying Su
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
CFChuanpu Fu
Chuanpu Fu
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu
Connectionless protocols such as ICMP and UDP are manipulated to construct novel information leakage channels by which attackers can disrupt TCP connections or leak secret information. Existing solutions have mainly focused on repairing vulnerable protocols through OS patches, which are OS-specific and slow to deploy. Other traditional defenses either cannot cover these attacks or are prone to incur unintended dropping of legitimate packets due to the heavily manipulated IP spoofing technique in these attacks. In this paper, we present StateShield, an in-network, real-time defense against state-of-the-art information leakage attacks over connectionless protocols. StateShield can detect and defend against various information leakage attacks without incurring unintended dropping of legitimate traffic, even when attackers heavily spoof the IP addresses of legitimate clients. To achieve that, we propose three indicators that can cover major attack vectors of connectionless information leakage channels and are effective for detecting more than ten attack variants. We design the architecture of StateShield based on programmable switches, with efficient data structures for monitoring and on-demand defense components in the data plane. We develop two novel defense components to mitigate UDP and ICMP-based information leakage channels automatically while achieving minimal unintended dropping of legitimate packets. Our extensive experiments show that StateShield can effectively mitigate more than ten attack variants in real time without hurting the services over legitimate connectionless packets, and the defense provided by StateShield is robust under high-intensive background traffic over connectionless protocols.

28 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XFXuewei Feng
Xuewei Feng
QLQi Li
Qi Li
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
YYYuxiang Yang
Yuxiang Yang
KXKe Xu
Ke Xu