1 October 2021 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack that can be used to terminate victim TCP connections or inject forged data into victim TCP connections by manipulating the new mixed IPID assignment method, which is widely used in Linux kernel version 4.18 and beyond. Our attack has three steps. First, an off-path attacker can downgrade the IPID assignment for TCP packets from the more secure per-socket-based policy to the less secure hash-based policy, thus building a shared IPID counter that forms a side channel in the victim. Second, the attacker detects the presence of TCP connections by observing the side channel of the shared IPID counter. Third, the attacker infers sequence and acknowledgment numbers of the detected connection by observing the side channel. Consequently, the attacker can completely hijack the connection, e.g., resetting the connection or poisoning the data stream. We evaluate the impacts of our attack in the real world, and we uncover that more than 20% of Alexa top 100k websites are vulnerable to our attack. Our case studies of SSH DoS, manipulating web traffic, and poisoning BGP routing tables show its threat on a wide range of applications. Moreover, we demonstrate that our attack can be further extended to exploit IPv4/IPv6 dual-stack networks on increasing the hash collisions and enlarging vulnerable populations. Finally, we analyze the root cause and develop a new IPID assignment method to defeat this attack. We prototype our defense in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness in the real world.
21 February 2025 in Communications of the ACM
22 April 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Secure data forwarding is critical for users to meet their requirements. In this paper, we propose D3 (Demon Detector in Data Plane), a source-driven, secure fault localization mechanism, which empowers the source to localize faulty link in Path Aware Networking, thus circumventing faulty link to guarantee secure data forwarding. D3 utilizes the source to instruct the on-path routers, thus empowering it to detect whether the on-path routers forward the packet as expected. Compared with existing schemes that are difficult to be deployed in practice due to the heavy storage, computation, and communication overhead, D3 offloads most of the on-path router's storage and computation overhead, thus dramatically improving the deployment efficiency. Particularly, the length of the additional packet header in D3 is 2-5 times less than the state-of-the-art mechanisms, thus having a low communication overhead. Besides that, the destination in D3 could keep stateless processing, thus having backward compatibility and eliminating the opportunity for DoS attacks toward a stateful destination. The BMv2 and Barefoot Tofino hardware evaluations show that D3 could achieve high fault localization accuracy and process the packet at line rate.
26 February 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Networking
Connectionless protocols such as ICMP and UDP are manipulated to construct novel information leakage channels by which attackers can disrupt TCP connections or leak secret information. Existing solutions have mainly focused on repairing vulnerable protocols through OS patches, which are OS-specific and slow to deploy. Other traditional defenses either cannot cover these attacks or are prone to incur unintended dropping of legitimate packets due to the heavily manipulated IP spoofing technique in these attacks. In this paper, we present StateShield, an in-network, real-time defense against state-of-the-art information leakage attacks over connectionless protocols. StateShield can detect and defend against various information leakage attacks without incurring unintended dropping of legitimate traffic, even when attackers heavily spoof the IP addresses of legitimate clients. To achieve that, we propose three indicators that can cover major attack vectors of connectionless information leakage channels and are effective for detecting more than ten attack variants. We design the architecture of StateShield based on programmable switches, with efficient data structures for monitoring and on-demand defense components in the data plane. We develop two novel defense components to mitigate UDP and ICMP-based information leakage channels automatically while achieving minimal unintended dropping of legitimate packets. Our extensive experiments show that StateShield can effectively mitigate more than ten attack variants in real time without hurting the services over legitimate connectionless packets, and the defense provided by StateShield is robust under high-intensive background traffic over connectionless protocols.