We assess the ability of a standard search and matching framework to account for the cyclical properties of key macroeconomic time series of the housing market. We calibrate a model with aggregate demand and supply shocks to match selected business cycle properties of vacancies and sales in the United States. Our model reproduces the cyclical time series properties of house prices and the positive and negative comovement of prices with sales and time on the market, respectively. Search and matching frictions produce trading delays that augment the volatility of prices and propagate the effect of aggregate shocks to future periods.
We study the effects of inflation in a competitive search model where each buyer's utility is private information, and money is essential. The equilibrium is efficient at the Friedman rule, but inflation creates an inefficiency in the terms of trade. Buyers experience a preference shock after they are matched with a seller, and thus they have a precautionary motive for holding money. Sellers, who compete to attract buyers, post non-linear price schedules. As inflation rises, sellers post relatively flat price schedules, which reduce the need for precautionary balances. These price schedules induce buyers with a low desire to consume to purchase inefficiently high quantities because of the low marginal cost of purchasing goods. In contrast, buyers with a high desire to consume purchase inefficiently low quantities as they face binding liquidity constraints. The model fits historical US data on velocity and interest rates.
8 June 2007 in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
The low velocity of circulation of money implies that households hold more money than they normally spend. This behavior is explained if households face uncertain expenditure needs, so that they have a precautionary motive for holding money. We investigate this motive in a search model where households are subject to preference shocks. The model predicts that velocity is not only low but also interest elastic. The model closely fits U.S. data on velocity and interest rates (1892–2004). The empirical analysis reveals a dramatic reduction in precautionary balances toward the end of our sample, which is important for policy issues.
We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.