Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro

Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro

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Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro

Universidade de São Paulo (USP); Universidad de Navarra

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 April 2017 in Socio-Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MWMichael A Witt
Michael A Witt
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
KAKenneth Amaeshi
Kenneth Amaeshi
SMSami Mahroum
Sami Mahroum
DBDorothee Bohle
Dorothee Bohle
LSLawrence Saez
Lawrence Saez
Efforts to build a universal theory of the world’s business systems require empirical grounding in an understanding of the variety that need explaining. To support such theorizing, we analyzed the institutional structures of 61 major economies, accounting for 93.5% of 2013 world GDP at purchasing power parity. We found nine main types of business systems: Highly Coordinated, Coordinated Market, Liberal Market, European Peripheral, Advanced Emerging, Advanced City, Arab Oil-Based, Emerging, and Socialist Economies. Our findings illustrate the need to go beyond the Varieties of Capitalism and Business Systems frameworks; provide empirical support for the CME versus LME dichotomy for part of the OECD; identify some of the business systems proposed recently as sub-types of larger clusters; indicate that institutional diversity may increase with development level; and cast doubt on the notions of state-led and family-led capitalism as types of business systems. Our discussion further suggests numerous avenues for theory development and empirical research.

29 December 2016 in Family Business Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
RARuth V. Aguilera
Ruth V. Aguilera
RCRafel Crespí-Cladera
Rafel Crespí-Cladera
We draw on the socioemotional wealth perspective to examine the influence of family ownership on firms’ noncompliance with corporate governance codes. Our results yield an inverted U-shaped effect of family ownership on noncompliance. While the family influence and control dimension leads to high levels of noncompliance, socioworthiness stemming from image and reputation dimension lessens noncompliance. In the presence of potential agency conflict, the control dimension prevails over reputation, even in countries with strong governance institutions. Our findings have critical implications for family business theory, for governance policy making and also for better understanding corporate governance in family firms.

1 June 2019 in Emerging Markets Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
DCDaniel Ferreira Caixe
Daniel Ferreira Caixe
AKAquiles Elie Guimarães Kalatzis
Aquiles Elie Guimarães Kalatzis
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro

26 April 2012
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Book Chapter
Closed access
RARuth V. Aguilera
Ruth V. Aguilera
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
JLJun Ho Lee
Jun Ho Lee
JYJihae You
Jihae You
The turning of the twenty-first century has been marked by reforms in corporate governance practices around the world. Prevalent ways of doing business are changing with increasing demands for corporate transparency and accountability, shifts in ownership control, empowerment of new types of owner, and so on. Countries and firms have adapted their corporate governance policies and practices accordingly. This chapter explores the current patterns of the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in six emerging countries: Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the beginning of the twenty-first century, and compare our data with existing research from the 1990s. The chapter concludes that, although concentration of corporate shareholdings continues to be a common denominator among these emerging countries, the processes and structures controlling firms are remarkably different.

1 November 2019 in Revista de Administração Contemporânea
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Journal Article
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ABAureliano Bressan
Aureliano Bressan
Eduardo SchiehllEduardo Schiehll
Eduardo Schiehll
JPJairo Laser Procianoy
Jairo Laser Procianoy
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Resumo Este artigo apresenta as perspectivas da pesquisa em Governança de Empresas Familiares no Brasil, resultantes da chamada desta edição especial da RAC endereçada ao tema. Os dois artigos tratam de temas relevantes no debate acadêmico, a saber: a necessidade de um arcabouço teórico para a avaliação de processos decisórios estratégicos de empresas familiares; e a importância da diversidade de gênero nos conselhos de administração destas empresas. As proposições e evidências elencadas nos dois estudos, relativas aos construtos e variáveis que apresentaram consistência teórica ou estatística, abrem uma nova frente de pesquisa sobre o tema no Brasil, relacionada à conciliação da heterogeneidade da composição dos Conselhos de Administração com a criação de valor em Empresas Familiares.

1 June 2015 in RAE: Revista de Administracao de Empresas
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Journal Article
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MGMarina Gelman
Marina Gelman
LCLuiz Ricardo Kabbach DE Castro
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach DE Castro
VSValentin Seidler
Valentin Seidler
Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar o efeito das cláusulas que vinculam o voto dos conselheiros ao acordo de acionistas no valor da firma. A partir de uma base de dados de 181 empresas listadas nos segmentos especiais da BM&FBovespa entre os anos de 2008 e 2012, estudamos o efeito da inclusão de cláusulas genéricas e específicas de vínculo de voto no valor das empresas. Verificamos um efeito negativo do acordo de acionistas no valor da firma, que se acentua na presença de cláusulas genéricas e se ameniza na presença de cláusulas específicas de vínculo de voto ao acordo de acionistas. Esses resultados são consistentes mesmo controlando pela endogeneidade da decisão pelo acordo de acionistas. Assim, os resultados apontam para um "efeito entrincheiramento" dos acionistas de controle no uso dos acordos de acionistas como mecanismo de compartilhamento de controle e voto. Este artigo contribui para a literatura em governança e finanças corporativas ao revelar práticas que enfraquecem a atuação de um dos principais pilares de governança, o conselho de administração.