1 November 1990 in Fusion Engineering and Design
1 January 1990 in Science & Global Security
In the absence of shielding, “ordinary” nuclear weapons—those containing kilogram quantities of ordinary weapon‐grade (6 percent plutonium‐240) plutonium or uranium‐238—can be detected by neutron or gamma counters at a distance of tens of meters. Objects such as missile canisters can be radiographed with high‐energy x‐rays to reveal the presence of the dense fissile core of any type of nuclear warhead, or the radiation shielding that might conceal a warhead. If subjected to neutron irradiation, the fissile core of any type of unshielded warhead can also be detected by the emission of prompt‐or delayed‐fission neutrons at a distance on the order of 10 meters.
1 January 1991 in International Security
1 June 2005 in Nuclear Technology
We assess the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent fuel. The uranium price at which reprocessing spent fuel from light water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is estimated for a range of reprocessing prices and other fuel cycle costs. The contribution of both fuel cycle options to the cost of electricity is also estimated. A similar analysis is performed to compare fast neutron reactors (FRs) with LWRs. We review available information about various fuel cycle costs, as well as the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable at a range of future prices. We conclude that the once-through LWR fuel cycle is likely to remain significantly cheaper than recycling in either LWRs or FRs for at least the next 50 yr, even with substantial growth in nuclear power.
1 January 1988 in Fusion Engineering and Design