We work with a panel of bilateral trade, exploring the influence of infrastructure and institutional quality on patterns of trade with a Poisson estimator, extended with the Baier and Berstrand method for multilateral resistance and accounting for firm heterogeneity and selection. Trade depends on institutional quality and exporter and importer access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure. While we emphasize exports of developing countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in the South also limits market access for exports from the North. The pattern of results implies that policy emphasis on developing country market access while not providing enough support for trade facilitation, may be misplaced
Because of concern that tariff reductions in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) countries will translate into worsening export performance for the least developed countries, the erosion of trade preferences may become a stumbling block for multilateral trade liberalization. An econometric analysis of actual preference use shows that preferences are underused because of administrative burdens—estimated to be equivalent to an average of 4 percent of the value of goods traded. To quantify the maximum scope for preference erosion, the compliance cost estimates are used in a model-based assessment of the impact of full elimination of oecd tariffs. Taking into account administrative costs eliminates erosion costs in the aggregate and greatly reduces the losses for countries most affected by preference erosion.
We examine the potential impact of TTIP through trade-cost reductions, applying a mix of econometric and computational methods to develop estimates of the benefits (and costs) for the EU, United States, and third countries. Econometric results point to an approximate 80% growth in bilateral trade with an ambitious trade agreement. However, at the same time, computable general equilibrium (CGE) estimates highlight distributional impacts across countries and factors not evident from econometrics alone. Translated through our CGE framework, while bilateral trade increases roughly 80%, there is a fall of about 2.5% in trade with the rest of the world in our central case. The estimated gains in annual consumption range between 1% and 2.25% for the United States and EU, respectively. A purely discriminatory agreement would harm most countries outside the agreement, while the direction of third-country effects hinges critically on whether NTB reductions end up being discriminatory or not. Within the United States and EU, while labour gains across skill categories, the impact on farmers is mixed.