Lifting preferences over candidates to preferences over sets of candidates allows us to give a very natural notion of manipulability for social choice functions. In particular, we give simple conditions over the liftings entailing the manipulability of reasonable social choice functions. Our result is a weak version of Barberà and Kelly's Theorem, indeed it can be obtained from this last Theorem. However, we give a direct and very natural proof of our manipulability Theorem which is informative about the nature of the liftings allowing manipulability.
In most classical models of belief change, epistemic states are represented by theories (AGM) or formulas (Katsuno-Mendelzon) and the new pieces of information by formulas. The Representation Theorem for revision operators says that operators are represented by total preorders. This important representation is exploited by Darwiche and Pearl to shift the notion of epistemic state to a more abstract one, where the paradigm of epistemic state is indeed that of a total preorder over interpretations. In this work, we introduce a 3-valued logic where the formulas can be identified with a generalisation of total preorders of three levels: a ranking function mapping interpretations into the truth values. Then we analyse some sort of changes in this kind of structures and give syntactical characterizations of them.