20 June 2021 in Journal of Borderlands Studies
The article focuses on the phenomenon of post-Soviet de facto borders (viz. the borders of Abkhazia, the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Lugansk People’s Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The author outlines similarities and differences of these de facto borders in comparison with internationally recognized ones and compares border policies implemented by individual post-Soviet de facto states. While de facto states utilized their borders to combat the pandemic largely in the same ways as recognized states did, their pandemic border regimes were less legitimate for the international community and thus de facto states were more dependent on cross-border relations with their “patrons,” having no other viable options. The author also argues that even de facto states with similar geographical and political conditions chose partially different policies for managing pandemic bordered restrictions.
15 June 2021 in Problems of Post-Communism
The article considers the role of Russian border controls in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, including its impacts on immigration and customs controls and on cross-border social and economic activities. Although in March 2020 Russian border controls proved to be insufficient, they still were used as one of the main tools for immobilizing people. The sanitary bordered order contributed to social exclusion of marginalized groups. Meanwhile, those who had money, access to decision-making, eligible immigration status, ability to make their voices heard, or access to advanced knowledge on travel logistics still had some options to move across the “closed border.”
1 October 2013 in Geopolitics
Mainstream post-positivist approaches to Border Studies typically represent national borders as losing their importance or blurring. This insight usually fails to grasp the perspective of those who have to cross ‘hard’ borders, for whom these borders are primarily ‘hard facts’ quite precisely restricting territorial limits of their movement. Aiming to take this perspective and practical problems experienced by such border crossers into account, the author proposes an approach focusing on communication between those who cross ‘hard’ borders and those who protect these borders. The case of the EU-Russian border shows that border crossers have an increasing range of options to make themselves heard by their own country's officials, though it is much more difficult for them to reach gatekeepers and public on the other side of the border without resorting to intermediaries (such as their states or business actors). The author suggests that border crossers could be heard better if cross-border cooperation initiatives would prioritise this purpose thus making the EU's external borders not only ‘friendly’ or ‘blurred’ but also ‘dialogic’.
16 September 2025 in Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
This paper analyses the limitations of Eurocentric approaches to cross-border cooperation (CBC) studies, arguing that the European experience should not serve as a universal conceptual or practical benchmark. Globally, European CBC is more the exception than the rule, shaped by favorable conditions: strong political backing for regional integration, a democratic environment enabling cross-border interaction, legal frameworks supporting CBC institutions, and generous funding managed through efficient governance. By contrast, in most regions, CBC unfolds under political centralization, strict state control over formal and informal cross-border exchanges, limited financial resources, and a widespread informal border economy—largely overlooked in Eurocentric frameworks. Still, the EU model should not be dismissed. Among other things, it provides a toolkit from which specific elements—such as funding mechanisms, guidance on overcoming CBC obstacles, and cooperative aspects of integrated border management—can be selectively adapted to different contexts. Even authoritarian regimes may benefit from modified CBC institutions, provided they focus on a narrow set of depoliticized technical issues. Many partner states may also find value in the EU’s competitive, project-based funding model and in its technical guidelines addressing common CBC challenges.
1 August 2016 in Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
Those who have to cross “hard” borders face many problems on their way, including arbitrary and unjust treatment by consular and border guard officers, protracted and nitpicking inspections and extortion by customs officers, and huge traffic congestions. This article examines the extent to which various categories of people crossing the European Union-Russian border can self-organize in order to act together and be heard better for solving these and other issues. Tourists, shuttle traders, and truck drivers working for international cargo carriers are taken as three case studies for the research. I argue that all of the three mentioned categories of border crossers are capable of self-organizing in various ways: tourists—by exchanging best practices within thematic networks, shuttle traders—by taking advantage of their ability to gather in their common places of residence and (as well as truck drivers) near checkpoints when traffic congestions arise, truck drivers—also by taking advantage of support from influential business associations. It is also important that the audibility of border crossers’ voices can be seriously amplified by mediators, among which officials, politicians, business structures, and the mass media are the most efficient. At the same time, the capability of these three kinds of border crossers to make their voices heard is very limited, since their interactions are typically weak and instable and since officials are much more powerful.
1 January 2024 in Political Expertise: POLITEX
IRInstitute of World Economy and International Relations RAS
Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS
Numerous forecasts emphasize the danger of escalating conflicts over freshwater resources in Central Asia due to such factors, as limited availability of water resources across much of the region, rapid population growth, adverse consequences of the global warming, and contradictions between agricultural and energy needs of the region’s states. Despite the relatively abundant research on the issue of water scarcity in Central Asia, the analyses of potential causes of conflict escalation and of the range of actors of these potential conflicts do look fragmentary and not sufficiently logical. Findings of most studies seem outdated and not paying due attention to the interplay between water issues and energy security. This article is devoted to complex analysis of the role of those factors that could potentially lead to an exacerbation of water conflicts in Central Asia. The author concludes that the escalation of conflicts over Central Asian water resources is by no means inevitable and not even the most likely scenario. Countries of the region have a wide range of opportunities to prevent the exacerbation of the issue. This could involve efforts to save water, gaining access to additional water resources, and achieving interstate compromises to mitigate tensions between upstream and downstream states regarding seasonal water distribution. However, taking advantage of these opportunities is also challenging given a range of economic and political obstacles. This brings a lot of uncertainty into the future developments.