In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism’s implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On’s neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework.
24 March 2024 in European journal of analytic philosophy
In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter...
As some authors have recently pointed out, the notion of first-person authority has an importantly social dimension: it concerns not only how one’s mental self-ascriptions can be usually (or always) true, but also how one’s interlocutor can presume such mental self-ascriptions to be true (Borgoni 2019, Winokur 2023). An adequate theory of first-person authority should account for both aspects of the phenomenon, but the traditional discussion has focused mainly on the former. In this paper, I will reexamine Davidson’s account of first-person authority in this light and argue that it has interesting theoretical resources to address both aspects of first-person authority within a unified framework. In the literature, there is a consensus that (1) the key idea in Davidson’s account is to explain first-person authority in terms of a speaker’s authoritative knowledge of the meanings of her own words, and (2) Davidson explains the special status of a speaker’s semantic knowledge by invoking his non-communitarian view of meaning-determination. I will argue that, to see a fuller picture of Davidson’s view on first-person authority, these ideas need to be integrated with his discussion on triangulation, where he purports to show that meaning should be essentially social and interpretable. This will allow us to recognize how Davidson's theoretical system, as a whole, is indeed tailored to capturing the social dimension of first-person authority highlighted in the recent discussion.
1 January 2025 in Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to show how Kripke's influential discussion of the rule-following paradox (Kripke 1982) is at bottom motivated by a rationalist idea about knowledge of meaning that each linguistic agent should be able to non-inferentially know what one's own words mean, qua a speaker who confers meanings on them by their use. The second is to argue that a promising strategy for incorporating the rationalist idea is to recognize how the required kind of non-inferential knowledge of meaning is implicated in a speaker's practical ability to perform what I call acts of meaning explication.