T. Y. Branch

T. Y. Branch

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

T. Y. Branch

University of Cologne, Koeln, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
22 January 2024 in Synthese
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HDHeather Douglas
Heather Douglas
TBT. Y. Branch
T. Y. Branch
While the Value-Free Ideal (VFI) had many precursors, it became a solidified bulwark of normative claims about scientific reasoning and practice in the mid-twentieth century. Since then, it has played a central role in the philosophy of science, first as a basic presupposition of how science should work, then as a target for critique, and now as a target for replacement. In this paper, we will argue that a narrow focus on the VFI is misguided, because the VFI coalesced in the midst of other important shifts in the relationship between science and society. In particular, the mid-twentieth century saw the acceptance of the “social contract for science,” a tacit agreement between scientists and government officials, and more broadly between science and society. It was built around three core concepts: a distinction between basic and applied science, a conception of scientific freedom that limited social responsibility for scientists, and a justification for public funding of basic science in the form of the linear model. Within the conceptual framework of the social contract for science, it is clearer both (1) why the VFI was adopted, (2) why it is difficult to replace the VFI within the old social contract, and (3) how we need to revise the social contract for science in order to replace the VFI.

28 April 2022 in Social Epistemology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TBT.Y. Branch
T.Y. Branch
GOGloria Origgi
Gloria Origgi
TMTiffany Morisseau
Tiffany Morisseau
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the considerable challenge of sourcing expertise and determining which experts to trust. Dissonant information fostered controversy in public discourse and encouraged an appeal to a wide range of social indicators of trustworthiness in order to decide whom to trust. We analyze public discourse on expertise by examining how social indicators inform the reputation of Dr. Didier Raoult, the French microbiologist who rose to international prominence as an early advocate for using hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19. To comprehend how these indicators came to inform his reputation, we outline Dr. Raoult’s rise to fame based on discourse about hydroxychloroquine. We then discuss why we trust in experts like scientist-practitioners. This is followed by an examination of how social indicators of trust like status, epistemic authority, influence and values have informed Dr. Raoult’s reputation. We conclude with recommendations for how to improve the selection and evaluation of social indicators of trust and reputations. Our aim here, instead of making a claim about the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine or Dr. Raoult’s reputation per se, is to outline through this case study how social indicators of trust inform reputation and the challenge they present to evaluating expertise.

8 December 2022 in Science, Technology, & Human Values
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TBT. Y. Branch
T. Y. Branch
GDG. M. Duché
G. M. Duché
Science and technology studies (STS) practitioners regularly use qualitative research methods to describe the structures and practices of science. Despite a long history of collaborative inter- and transdisciplinary research in the field, key aspects of this type of research remain underexplored. For example, much of the literature on positionality has focused on the vulnerable position of participants and there is considerably less work on how investigators can be vulnerable. We examine how investigators in collaborative sociotechnical integration (CSTI) are vulnerable by presenting two examples of CSTI research that require researcher vulnerability. This vulnerability has an emotional dimension, which also necessitates affective labor. We integrate recommendations from feminist-scholarship to minimize the affective cost to investigators and explore how they might apply to qualitative research more broadly.

29 August 2022 in Social Epistemology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TBT. Y. Branch
T. Y. Branch
Publics trust experts for personal and pro-social reasons. Scientists are among the experts publics trust most, and so, epistemic trust is routinely afforded to them. The call for epistemic trust to be more socially situated in order to account for the impact of science on society and public welfare is at the forefront of enhanced epistemic trust. I argue that the value-free ideal for science challenges establishing enhanced epistemic trust by preventing the inclusion of non-epistemic values throughout the evaluation of evidence and communication of these values. By selectively silencing non-epistemic values, the ideal cannot take into account publics’ social and moral responses to inductive risk, which are instrumental for defining and determining public welfare. Furthermore, by emphasising epistemic values almost exclusively in science education and communication, the value-free ideal is presented to publics in such a way that it becomes a social indicator of trust. I show this through examination of the importance of values in decisions to trust, and conclude that values (and restrictions on them) can be used by lay publics to help decide which experts to trust.

5 October 2023 in Philosophy of Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TBT. Y. Branch
T. Y. Branch
HDHeather Douglas
Heather Douglas
Replacing the value-free ideal (VFI) for science requires attention to the broader understanding of how science in society should function. In public spaces, science needed to project the VFI in norms for science advising, science education, and science communication. This resulted in the independent science advisor model and a focus on science literacy for science education and communication. Attending to these broader implications of the VFI that structure science and society relationships is crucial if we are to properly replace the VFI with a better ideal.

3 September 2022 in Social Epistemology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TBT. Y. Branch
T. Y. Branch
GOGloria Origgi
Gloria Origgi
Expert knowledge regularly informs personal and civic-decision making. To decide which experts to trust, lay publics-including policymakers and experts from other domains-use different epistemic and non-epistemic cues. Epistemic cues such as honesty, like when experts are forthcoming about conflicts of interest, are a popular way of understanding how people evaluate and decide which experts to trust. However, many other epistemic cues, like the evidence supporting information from experts, are inaccessible to lay publics. Therefore, lay publics simultaneously use second-order social cues in their environment to inform decisions to trust. These second-order social cues, or 'social indicators of trust', prevent lay publics from having to trust blindly. Social indicators of trust therefore inform lay publics' epistemic vigilance, or constant low level-monitoring of testimony from experts. This special issue examines the nature, acquisition and application of social indicators of trust for scientific experts and institutions. It also raises questions about the types of trust asked of lay publics and challenges traditional normative assumptions about the relationship between science and lay publics through study of attitudes, values, and experiences. The issue descriptively re-examines the structure of institutions, their role and methods for ferrying information, as well as how social indicators operate in times of crisis. In this collection of works, we bridge history, science, philosophy of science, science and technology studies, science communication and social epistemology, to broaden the discourse on trust in experts and more accurately reflect the imperfect yet indispensable endeavour that trusting is.