Qiuping Peng

Qiuping Peng

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Qiuping Peng

South China Agricultural University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2021 in Personnel Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QPQiuping Peng
Qiuping Peng
XZXi Zhong
Xi Zhong
SLshanshi liu
shanshi liu
HZHuaikang Zhou
Huaikang Zhou
NKNannan Ke
Nannan Ke
Purpose: In this paper, the moderating roles of leader reward omission and person–supervisor fit in the relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding are investigated.Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of 248 employees in a two-wave survey, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypotheses.Findings: The results revealed that employees with high job autonomy were less likely to engage in knowledge hiding. Moreover, when employees experienced leader reward omission, the negative relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding was weakened, and this interesting effect varied by person–supervisor fit.Research limitations/implications: This study does not explore the mediating mechanism by which job autonomy affects employee knowledge hiding. Moreover, as this research was conducted in a Chinese context, the generalizability of our findings is unclear.Practical implications: This research has fulfilled its practical aims by providing advice on knowledge-relevant job characteristic factors that can be used to stage interventions regarding the provision of autonomy in jobs, and by carefully considering how to create interdependence between jobs without pushing people to engage in knowledge-hiding behaviors. Furthermore, it is important for leaders to help employees identify work goals and directions and not engage in reward omission.Originality/value: This study contributes to theoretical advancements in the field of knowledge hiding by revealing boundary conditions that mitigate or enhance the impact of job autonomy on knowledge hiding.

23 November 2021 in European Journal of Innovation Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHe Wan
He Wan
QPQiuping Peng
Qiuping Peng
XZXi Zhong
Xi Zhong
Purpose: Noncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting corporate innovation. However, too many noncontrolling large shareholders may also lead to excessive supervision, thereby inhibiting innovative activities that contribute to the long-term value of the firm. Research to date, however, has not examined the nonlinear impact of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation. Based on principal–agent theory and the too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) effect, the authors discuss the inverted U-shaped influence of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation and the moderating effect of industry competition and corporate product diversification on the above relationship.Design/methodology/approach: Based on the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2017, the authors use the bidirectional fixed effects model to conduct empirical testing and robustness testing of the research hypotheses.Findings: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation; type I and type II agency costs play a mediating role between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation. In addition, firm product diversification weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation, but industry competition has no significant moderating effect on the above relationship.Practical implications: This research has important implications for policy makers, to better activate corporate innovation vitality, and investors, to better choose investment targets. Specifically, investors and policy makers should be aware that an appropriate increase in larger noncontrolling shareholders can maximize the enthusiasm of firms for innovation and enhance corporate value, but they should also realize that having too many noncontrolling large shareholders may backfire.Originality/value: This research helps the authors to understand the pros and cons of increasing the number of noncontrolling large shareholders more comprehensively and also helps to understand corporate innovation more comprehensively from a supervisory perspective. In addition, this research also enhances the explanatory and predictive power of the TMGT effect.

1 June 2022 in Baltic Journal of Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXi Zhong
Xi Zhong
QPQiuping Peng
Qiuping Peng
TWTian Wang
Tian Wang
Purpose: Based on social dilemma theory, the authors analyze the impact of leader reward omission on employee knowledge sharing and the boundary conditions in their relationship.Design/methodology/approach: This study tested the theoretical hypotheses based on empirical data obtained from 264 employees using a two-wave survey method.Findings: The results indicate that leader reward omission significantly negatively affects employee knowledge sharing. An employee's proactive personality weakens the negative relationship between them; the weakening effects of an employee's proactive personality would decrease along with the perceived increase in organizational unfairness.Originality/value: This study provides the first insight that leader reward omission can inhibit employee knowledge-sharing behavior. In addition, this study shows that an individual proactive personality and perceived organizational unfairness moderate the relationship between leader reward omission and employee knowledge behavior. Thus, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding of whether and when leader reward omission affects employee knowledge sharing.

7 July 2026 in Academy of Management Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SLShuye Lu
Shuye Lu
HZHuaikang Zhou
Huaikang Zhou
QPQiuping Peng
Qiuping Peng
NLNing Li
Ning Li