2 August 2017 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
28 November 2022 in Current Directions in Psychological Science
Human decisions are context dependent in ways that violate classical norms of rational choice. However, these norms implicitly depend on idealized descriptive assumptions that are often unrealistic. We focus on one such assumption: that information is constant across contexts. Choice contexts often supply subtle cues—which may be embedded in frames, procedures, or menus—to which human decision makers can be highly sensitive. We review recent evidence that some important context effects reflect dynamically coherent belief and preference updating, in response to ecologically valid cues. This evidence paints a more nuanced picture of human rationality in natural choice environments and opens up prospects for nonpaternalistic forms of choice architecture.
1 December 2019 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
Using psychology professors as participants, the present study investigates how publications in low-impact psychology journals affect evaluations of a hypothetical tenure-track psychology job applicant. Are "weak" publications treated as evidence for or against a candidate's ability? Two experiments revealed that an applicant was rated as stronger when several weak publications were added to several strong ones and was rated as weaker when the weak publications were removed. A third experiment showed that the additional weak publications were not merely viewed as a signal of additional strong publications in the future; instead, the weak publications themselves appear to be valued. In a fourth and final experiment, we found that adding a greater number of weak publications also strengthened the applicant, but not more so than adding just a few. The study further suggests that the weak publications may signal ability, as applicants with added weak publications were rated as both more hardworking and more likely to generate innovative research ideas. Advice for tenure-track psychology applicants: Do not hesitate to publish in even the weakest journals, as long as it does not keep you from publishing in strong journals. Implications of the market rewarding publications in low-impact journals are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
1 November 2025 in Psychological Review
Traditional models of rational choice assume that preferences are complete, but the completeness axiom is neither normatively compelling nor psychologically plausible. Building on recent work in economics, we develop a rational analysis of decision making with incomplete preferences. The analysis sheds surprising light on a range of well-known behavioral "anomalies," including the endowment effect, status quo maintenance, the sunk cost effect, and coherent arbitrariness. We propose a two-part division of rational choice theory-into preference theory and "implementation theory"-and show how conservative and coherently arbitrary policies can effectively implement incomplete preferences. The two-part normative framework motivates a psychological distinction between evaluation and implementation phases in decision making. We argue that the endowment effect and related phenomena, which have usually been attributed to loss aversion in the evaluation phase, are better explained by conservatism in the implementation phase. The rational analysis challenges the normative adequacy of expected utility theory and raises questions about the explanatory scope of prospect theory. It illustrates the rich interplay between psychological models of value structure and normative models of rational choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
19 March 2019 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Asked to judge the subjective size of numbers in a between-subjects design, participants rated 9 as larger than 221 (Birnbaum, 1999). The 9 > 221 effect seems to indicate that different stimuli evoke...