Guanmei Liu

Guanmei Liu

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Guanmei Liu

Nanjing Audit University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 September 2000 in Journal of Cellular Biochemistry
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWande Li
Wande Li
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu
ICIih‐Nan Chou
Iih‐Nan Chou
HKHerbert M. Kagan
Herbert M. Kagan

4 June 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu
HWHaijun Wang
Haijun Wang
XSXiaofeng Shao
Xiaofeng Shao

1 March 2020 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu
XSXiaofeng Shao
Xiaofeng Shao
XLXiao Lang
Xiao Lang

11 July 2024 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu
YZYunning Zhao
Yunning Zhao
SZShenghai Zhou
Shenghai Zhou
XSXiaofeng Shao
Xiaofeng Shao

29 March 2023 in International Transactions in Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHaijun Wang
Haijun Wang
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu

3 April 2019 in Journal of Management Analytics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GLGuanmei Liu
Guanmei Liu
RJRuisi Jiang
Ruisi Jiang
XSXiaofeng Shao
Xiaofeng Shao
This paper focuses on coordinating contingent assistance between two lateral suppliers controlled by a central firm, when one supplier is exposed to supply disruption. By comparing two scenarios where the central firm can/cannot coordinate contingent assistance, we find the coordination of contingent assistance is more efficient, thus the central firm should do that. In the scenario without coordination, if the holding cost of the disrupted supplier is low, while the opportunity cost of the reliable supplier is high relatively, allowing the reliable supplier to hold decision power of assistance price can generate more assistance quantity for the disrupted supplier and bring more profits for the central firm. However, if the holding cost is high, and the opportunity cost is low relatively, the disrupted supplier can receive more assistance quantity, and the central firm can get more profits, by letting the disrupted supplier have the power to decide assistance price.