This article examines the effect of state ownership on the labor cost stickiness of firms in 22 European countries. States are more likely to interfere in the decision-making processes of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and demand firm activities that are desirable from a socio-political perspective. For example, to win political support, politicians may instruct SOEs to avoid layoffs to minimize unemployment rates. The varied objectives of SOEs also make it more difficult to control managers' behavior, leaving more room for managerial discretion and the pursuit of self-interests through empire-building behavior. Both state intervention and managerial self-interest restrain managers from laying off employees or reducing employee wages when sales decrease, which may lead to greater labor cost stickiness. Data from 1993 to 2012 reveal that SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms, and their labor cost stickiness also varies predictably with socio-political variables such as election years and left-wing governments.
This study examines the relations among various types of management control, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and performance in the public sector. We draw on motivation crowding theory and self-determination theory to argue that four different types of management control (i.e. personnel, cultural, action, and results control) are likely to have an influence on intrinsic motivation and/or extrinsic motivation. We test a structural equation model using survey data from 105 similar departments in the public sector. Our findings indicate that the use of personnel and cultural controls is positively associated with employees’ intrinsic motivation, and that the use of results controls is positively associated with employees’ extrinsic motivation. Moreover, both intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are positively associated with performance. Taken together, these findings support the idea advocated by New Public Management proponents that results control can enhance employee motivation and performance in the public sector. However, the findings also highlight an essential nuance; in addition to results control, personnel and cultural controls are also important, as they enhance intrinsic motivation and performance. This implies that a sole focus on results control is too narrow and can lead to suboptimal levels of employee motivation and performance in the public sector.
1 February 2010 in Accounting, Organizations and Society
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how management control (MC) within governmental departments is used in times of austerity, and how insights from agency and stewardship theory can enhance the understanding of this issue. Design/methodology/approach – The authors distinguish two types of MC (constraining and facilitating) based on their different assumptions regarding human behavior (agent-like and steward-like). The authors empirically analyze changes in the use of these types of MC in four cases located in two municipalities. The collected data consists of 51 semi-structured interviews, desk research and multiple field observations. Findings – The authors find that MC at the departmental level becomes more constraining in times of austerity. The authors suggest that an overemphasis on constraining MC has negative consequences. It can, for instance, evoke agent-like, opportunistic behavior while it disregards potential steward-like behavior. These negative consequences are less prevalent ...