Governments worldwide have implemented countless policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We present an initial public release of a large hand-coded dataset of over 13,000 such policy announcements across more than 195 countries. The dataset is updated daily, with a 5-day lag for validity checking. We document policies across numerous dimensions, including the type of policy, national versus subnational enforcement, the specific human group and geographical region targeted by the policy, and the time frame within which each policy is implemented. We further analyse the dataset using a Bayesian measurement model, which shows the quick acceleration of the adoption of costly policies across countries beginning in mid-March 2020 through 24 May 2020. We believe that these data will be instrumental for helping policymakers and researchers assess, among other objectives, how effective different policies are in addressing the spread and health outcomes of COVID-19.
While fixed effects (FE) models are often employed to address potential omitted variables, we argue that these models’ real utility is in isolating a particular dimension of variance from panel data for analysis. In addition, we show through novel mathematical decomposition and simulation that only one-way FE models cleanly capture either the over-time or cross-sectional dimensions in panel data, while the two-way FE model unhelpfully combines within-unit and cross-sectional variation in a way that produces un-interpretable answers. In fact, as we show in this paper, if we begin with the interpretation that many researchers wrongly assign to the two-way FE model—that it represents a single estimate of X on Y while accounting for unit-level heterogeneity and time shocks—the two-way FE specification is statistically unidentified, a fact that statistical software packages like R and Stata obscure through internal matrix processing.
I propose a new model, ordered Beta regression, for continuous distributions with both lower and upper bounds, such as data arising from survey slider scales, visual analog scales, and dose–response relationships. This model employs the cut point technique popularized by ordered logit to fit a single linear model to both continuous (0,1) and degenerate [0,1] responses. The model can be estimated with or without observations at the bounds, and as such is a general solution for these types of data. Employing a Monte Carlo simulation, I show that the model is noticeably more efficient than ordinary least squares regression, zero-and-one-inflated Beta regression, rescaled Beta regression, and fractional logit while fully capturing nuances in the outcome. I apply the model to a replication of the Aidt and Jensen (2014,European Economic Review72, 52–75) study of suffrage extensions in Europe. The model can be fit with the R packageordbetaregto facilitate hierarchical, dynamic, and multivariate modeling.
What explains the great variation in the adoption, timing, and duration of government policies made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? In this article, we explore whether government incentives to repress domestic dissidents influence their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that COVID-19 containment policies are observationally equivalent to those that abusive governments use to limit domestic dissent – that is, policies that restrict citizens’ freedom of movement. This creates an opportunity for abusive governments to engage in repressive behavior without countervailing pressure from citizens and the international community. Following this logic, we expect abusive governments to be more likely to adopt restrictive policies, adopt them earlier in the course of the pandemic, and take longer to relax restrictions. Empirically, we find that governments that have recently engaged in state violence against civilians or abused citizens’ human rights were about 10% more likely to enact lockdown and curfew policies. Compared to less repressive countries, these policies were implemented approximately 48 days earlier in the pandemic and kept in place for approximately 23 days longer. Overall, our results advance our understanding of how the repressiveness of state institutions can shape policy responses to a global health crisis.
Episodes of mass political violence, such as genocide and civil war, have been thought to both encourage and discourage future political mobilization. We square these competing hypotheses by disaggregating between protest onset and resilience. We argue that exposure to mass violence decades ago should on average decrease protest onset, by heightening fears of repression and retribution. However, conditional on protesting, prior exposure to violence should increase protest longevity, by generating greater political grievances that fuel commitment to the cause. We find evidence of both effects in Algeria during the 2019–20 Hirak protests that toppled President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Pairing an original dataset on massacres during the 1990s civil war with a rolling online survey of 18,000 Algerians in 2019–20, we find that areas exposed to greater violence in the 1990s had on average fewer, but more committed, protesters in 2019–20.
Objective: While the aim of COVID‐19 policies is to suppress the pandemic, many fear that the burden of the restrictions will fall more heavily on less privileged groups. We show one potential mechanism for COVID‐19 responses to increase inequality by examining the intersection of business restrictions and business political connections.Methods: We fielded an online survey of 2735 business employees and managers in Ukraine, Egypt, and Venezuela over the summer of 2020 to collect data on companies' closures due to COVID‐19 and nuanced information about their political connections.Findings: We show that businesses with political connections to government officials were significantly less likely to shut down as a result of COVID‐19 policies. This finding suggests that measures designed to mitigate COVID‐19 are ineffective in countries with a weak rule of law if politically connected firms are able to circumvent restrictions by leveraging political connections to receive preferential treatment. In addition, politically connected firms are no more likely—and sometimes even less likely—to engage in social‐distancing policies to mitigate the pandemic despite the fact that they are more likely to remain open.