Multinational corporations use highly complex structures of parents and subsidiaries to organize their operations and ownership. Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) facilitate these structures through low taxation and lenient regulation, but are increasingly under scrutiny, for instance for enabling tax avoidance. Therefore, the identification of OFC jurisdictions has become a politicized and contested issue. We introduce a novel data-driven approach for identifying OFCs based on the global corporate ownership network, in which over 98 million firms (nodes) are connected through 71 million ownership relations. This granular firm-level network data uniquely allows identifying both sink-OFCs and conduit-OFCs. Sink-OFCs attract and retain foreign capital while conduit-OFCs are attractive intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments and enable the transfer of capital without taxation. We identify 24 sink-OFCs. In addition, a small set of five countries – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland – canalize the majority of corporate offshore investment as conduit-OFCs. Each conduit jurisdiction is specialized in a geographical area and there is significant specialization based on industrial sectors. Against the idea of OFCs as exotic small islands that cannot be regulated, we show that many sink and conduit-OFCs are highly developed countries.
7 October 2019 in Review of International Political Economy
Cross-border state-led investment is a recently rising, but understudied phenomenon of the global political economy. Existing research employs an anecdotal and case-oriented perspective that does not engage in a systemic, large-scale analysis of this rise of transnational state investment and its consequences for the transformation of state power in 21st century capitalism. We take a first step at filling this gap and offer two original contributions: Conceptually, we operationalize transnational foreign state-led investment on the basis of weighted ownership ties. These state capital ties are created by states as investors in corporations around the world. Empirically, we demonstrate our approach by setting up and analyzing the largest dataset on transnational state capital up to date. We show which different outward strategies states as owners employ and classify states according to their relative positions within the global network of transnational state capital. Our results illustrate a crucial aspect of the ongoing transformation of state power and sovereignty within globalization and we demonstrate how a careful and data-driven approach is able to identify different pathways and dimensions of this transformation.
3 January 2021 in International Tax and Public Finance
Economic globalization has pressured countries to compete with one another for firms’ investment capital. Analyses of such competition draw heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics. In and of themselves, however, FDI statistics are merely a quantification of the value of firms’ investment projects and tell us little about the heterogeneity of these projects and the distinct patterns of competitive dynamics between countries they generate. Here, we create a more sophisticated understanding of international competition for FDI by pointing out its variegated nature. To do so, we trace the ‘great fragmentation of the firm’ to distinguish between five categories of FDI: manufacturing affiliates, shared service centers, R&D facilities, intermediate holding companies, and top holding companies. Using a novel combination of firm-level and country-level data, we identify for each of these different categories which European Union member states are most successful in attracting it, what macro-institutional and tax arrangements are present in them, and what benefits they receive from it in terms of tax revenues and employment creation. In this way, we are able to identify five distinct ‘FDI attraction profiles’ and show that competition increasingly appears to take place amongst subsets of countries that compete for similar categories of FDI.
Research Summary: Does it pay to be a multinational? Despite decades of empirical research, we still do not know. We undertake a large‐sample, cross‐national replication of Lu and Beamish (2004) and Berry and Kaul's (2016) works to examine whether the multinationality–performance relationship is S‐shaped in a 2009–2016 panel of 889,865 firm‐year observations. Using a two‐stage least squares fixed‐effects model that accounts for endogeneity on a subsample of 32,835 multinationals from 64 countries, we find no evidence of an S‐shaped relationship; nor do we see it in any of the single‐country contexts. Our results show no evidence of any within‐firm effect of multinationality on performance, highlighting the need for more contextually‐grounded research focused on explaining between‐firm effects to advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of the multinationality‐performance relationship. Managerial Summary: We replicate two studies that examined the relationship between a firm's multinationality and its performance. Lu and Beamish (2004) found evidence of an S‐shaped relationship—with performance first decreasing, then increasing, then decreasing again as firms expanded abroad—in a sample of Japanese firms; Berry and Kaul (2016) found no evidence of an S‐shaped pattern in a sample of U.S. multinationals. We test for the same relationship using data from nearly 250,000 firms based in over 100 countries from 2009 to 2016 and find no evidence of an S‐shaped pattern or of any effect of multinationality. Our study thus adds substantial evidence to the one shown by Berry and Kaul (2016), emphasizing the need to focus on how contextual differences influence the multinationality–performance relationship.
Corporations increasingly engage in innovative ‘tax planning strategies’ by shifting profits between jurisdictions. In response, states try to curtail such profit shifting activities while at the same time attempting to retain and attract multinational corporations. We aim to open up this dichotomy between states and corporations and argue that a wealth defence industry of professional service firms plays a crucial role as facilitators. We investigate the subsidiary structure of 27,000 MNCs and show that clients of the Big Four accountancy firms show systematically higher levels of aggressive tax planning strategies than clients of smaller accountancy firms. We specify this effect for three distinct strategies and also uncover marked differences across countries. As such we provide empirical evidence for the systematic involvement of auditors as facilitators in corporate wealth defence.