Enrique Fatas

Enrique Fatas

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Enrique Fatas

Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 May 2011 in Psychological Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NBNancy R. Buchan
Nancy R. Buchan
MBMarilynn B. Brewer
Marilynn B. Brewer
GGGianluca Grimalda
Gianluca Grimalda
RWRick K. Wilson
Rick K. Wilson
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
MFMargaret Foddy
Margaret Foddy
This research examined the question of whether the psychology of social identity can motivate cooperation in the context of a global collective. Our data came from a multinational study of choice behavior in a multilevel public-goods dilemma conducted among samples drawn from the general populations of the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. Results demonstrate that an inclusive social identification with the world community is a meaningful psychological construct that plays a role in motivating cooperation that transcends parochial interests. Self-reported identification with the world as a whole predicts behavioral contributions to a global public good beyond what is predicted from expectations about what other people are likely to contribute. Furthermore, global social identification is conceptually distinct from general attitudes about global issues, and has unique effects on cooperative behavior.

17 March 2009 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Closed access
NBNancy R. Buchan
Nancy R. Buchan
GGGianluca Grimalda
Gianluca Grimalda
RWRick K. Wilson
Rick K. Wilson
MBMarilynn Brewer
Marilynn Brewer
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
MFMargaret Foddy
Margaret Foddy
Globalization magnifies the problems that affect all people and that require large-scale human cooperation, for example, the overharvesting of natural resources and human-induced global warming. However, what does globalization imply for the cooperation needed to address such global social dilemmas? Two competing hypotheses are offered. One hypothesis is that globalization prompts reactionary movements that reinforce parochial distinctions among people. Large-scale cooperation then focuses on favoring one's own ethnic, racial, or language group. The alternative hypothesis suggests that globalization strengthens cosmopolitan attitudes by weakening the relevance of ethnicity, locality, or nationhood as sources of identification. In essence, globalization, the increasing interconnectedness of people worldwide, broadens the group boundaries within which individuals perceive they belong. We test these hypotheses by measuring globalization at both the country and individual levels and analyzing the relationship between globalization and individual cooperation with distal others in multilevel sequential cooperation experiments in which players can contribute to individual, local, and/or global accounts. Our samples were drawn from the general populations of the United States, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, and Iran. We find that as country and individual levels of globalization increase, so too does individual cooperation at the global level vis-à-vis the local level. In essence, “globalized” individuals draw broader group boundaries than others, eschewing parochial motivations in favor of cosmopolitan ones. Globalization may thus be fundamental in shaping contemporary large-scale cooperation and may be a positive force toward the provision of global public goods.

1 April 2005 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
Open access
RCRachel Croson
Rachel Croson
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
TNTibor Neugebauer
Tibor Neugebauer
Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

19 July 2010 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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Journal Article
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CECatherine Eckel
Catherine Eckel
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
RWRick K. Wilson
Rick K. Wilson

1 September 2007 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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JBJordi Brandts
Jordi Brandts
DCDavid J. Cooper
David J. Cooper
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most common cost type. This conformity effect may be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

1 June 2015 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RCRachel Croson
Rachel Croson
EFEnrique Fatas
Enrique Fatas
TNTibor Neugebauer
Tibor Neugebauer
AMAntonio J. Morales
Antonio J. Morales
Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors, both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability - exclusion of the lowest contributor - on contributions in three different team production settings. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that excludability increases contributions. Excludability is particularly effective in production settings where the average or maximum effort determines team production. In these settings, we observe almost immediate convergence to full contribution. In settings where the minimum effort determines team production, excludability leads to a large increase in contributions only if the value of the excluded individual's contribution to the public good is redistributed among the included individuals