Harald Merckelbach

Harald Merckelbach

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Harald Merckelbach

Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2017 in Consciousness and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HMH. Merckelbach
H. Merckelbach
IBI. Boskovic
I. Boskovic
DPD. Pesy
D. Pesy
MDM. Dalsklev
M. Dalsklev
SLS.J. Lynn
S.J. Lynn

8 June 2021 in Clinical Psychological Science
Verified
Journal Article
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PDF file
IMIvan Mangiulli
Ivan Mangiulli
Henry OtgaarHenry Otgaar
Henry Otgaar
MJMarko Jelicic
Marko Jelicic
HMHarald Merckelbach
Harald Merckelbach
Dissociative amnesia, defined as an inability to remember important autobiographical experiences, usually of a stressful nature, is a controversial phenomenon. We systematically reviewed 128 case studies of dissociative amnesia reported in 60 articles that appeared in peer-reviewed journals in English over the past 20 years (2000–2020). Our aim was to examine to what extent these cases met core features of dissociative amnesia. All cases were about reports of autobiographical memory loss, but the evidence offered in support of a dissociative amnesia interpretation was often weak and plagued by an ambiguous heterogeneity with respect to nature, etiology, and differential diagnoses of alleged memory loss. Most case studies failed to rule out plausible alternative explanations of dissociative amnesia, such as ordinary forgetting and malingering. We encourage clinicians and researchers to more critically investigate alleged cases of dissociative amnesia and provide criteria for how a dissociative amnesia case ideally would look like.

12 March 2021 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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Journal Article
Open access
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Henry OtgaarHenry Otgaar
Henry Otgaar
MHMark L. Howe
Mark L. Howe
ODOlivier Dodier
Olivier Dodier
SLScott O. Lilienfeld
Scott O. Lilienfeld
ELElizabeth F. Loftus
Elizabeth F. Loftus
LPLawrence Patihis
Lawrence Patihis
On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles’ similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people’s beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse).

1 March 2022 in Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
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Journal Article
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HMHarald Merckelbach
Harald Merckelbach
Henry OtgaarHenry Otgaar
Henry Otgaar
SLSteven Jay Lynn
Steven Jay Lynn

9 July 2010 in Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology
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Journal Article
Closed access
HMHarald Merckelbach
Harald Merckelbach
MJMarko Jelicic
Marko Jelicic
MPMaarten Pieters
Maarten Pieters
We conducted three studies that address the residual effects of instructed feigning of symptoms. In Experiment 1 (N = 31), undergraduates instructed to exaggerate symptoms on a malingering test continued to report more neurocognitive and psychiatric symptoms than did nonmalingering controls, when later asked to respond honestly to the same test. In Experiment 2 (N = 28), students completed a symptom list of psychiatric complaints and then were asked to explain why they had endorsed two target symptoms that they did not, in actuality, endorse. A total of 57% of participants did not detect this mismatch between actual and manipulated symptom endorsement and even tended to adopt the manipulated symptoms when provided with an opportunity to do so. In Experiment 3 (N = 28), we found that self-deceptive enhancement is related to the tendency to continue to report neurocognitive and psychiatric symptoms that initially had been produced intentionally. “Blindness” for the intentional aspect of symptom endorsement may explain the intrinsic overlap between feigning and somatoform complaints.

28 August 2012 in The Clinical Neuropsychologist
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HMHarald Merckelbach
Harald Merckelbach
TMThomas Merten
Thomas Merten
This paper proposes that malingered symptoms may become internalized due to the self-deceptive power of cognitive dissonance. Studies demonstrating how other-deception may turn into self-deception are briefly discussed, as are clinical notions about the overlap between malingering and medically unexplained symptoms. In our view this literature showcases the relevance of cognitive dissonance for research on malingering. A cognitive dissonance perspective may help to clarify how ambiguous sensations may escalate into subjectively compelling symptoms. This perspective suggests that malingered symptom reports are more than just a complication during psychological evaluation. It may generate new research avenues and may clarify practically relevant issues.