Joe Whittaker

Joe Whittaker

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Joe Whittaker

Department of Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Swansea University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
30 June 2021 in Internet Policy Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker
SLSeán Looney
Seán Looney
ARAlastair Reed
Alastair Reed
FVFabio Votta
Fabio Votta
Policymakers have recently expressed concerns over the role of recommendation algorithms and their role in forming “filter bubbles”. This is a particularly prescient concern in the context of extremist content online; these algorithms may promote extremist content at the expense of more moderate voices. In this article, we make two contributions to this debate. Firstly, we provide a novel empirical analysis of three platforms’ recommendation systems when interacting with far-right content. We find that one platform—YouTube—does amplify extreme and fringe content, while two—Reddit and Gab—do not. Secondly, we contextualise these findings into the regulatory debate. There are currently few policy instruments for dealing with algorithmic amplification, and those that do exist largely focus on transparency. We argue that policymakers have yet to fully understand the problems inherent in “de-amplifying” legal, borderline content and argue that a co-regulatory approach may offer a route towards tackling many of these challenges.

21 May 2025 in Archives of Sexual Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WCWilliam Costello
William Costello
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker
ATAndrew Thomas
Andrew Thomas
Incels (involuntary celibates) are an online subculture of men who form their identity around a perceived inability to form sexual or romantic relationships. This community operates almost exclusively online, often serving as an outlet for misogynistic hostility. Concerns about violence from incels have positioned them as a growing (inter)national security threat. This study, the largest primary investigation of incel harmful attitudes and beliefs to date (N = 561), recruited participants from the USA and the UK with a mean age of 26 years. Consistent with previous research, the sample showed ethnic and political diversity, poor mental health, high levels of suicidal ideation, and autistic traits. Using a 3N (needs, networks, and narratives) informed theoretical framework, our pathway analysis revealed that poor mental health and ideological adherence were twice as predictive of harmful attitudes and beliefs (e.g., displaced aggression, hostile sexism, and justification of violence) compared to networking, with a bidirectional effect between poor mental health and ideology. We also found two distinct indirect pathways to harmful attitudes and beliefs among incels: one involving experiential vulnerabilities (e.g., autism traits, low mate value, and histories of bullying and abuse) and the other rooted in dispositional traits (e.g., the dark triad and right-wing political orientation), leading us to propose the dual pathways hypothesis of incel harm. These findings suggest that interventions targeting mental health and ideology may be more effective than those focusing solely on online networking. Implications for intervention strategies, informed by these theoretical models, are discussed, including date coaching, therapy and role modeling from former incels. As issues of extremism, online radicalization, and mental health grow in importance, these insights are vital for policymakers, educators, journalists, and others addressing the challenges incels face and represent in society.

11 January 2021 in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NRNick Robinson
Nick Robinson
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker
Although the production of videogames by extremist and terrorist groups has markedly declined since a high point in the 2000s, game-based interventions remain highly significant, whether through the adoption of gaming-based iconography in extremist and terrorist social media campaigns or through the activity of modders and groups’ supporters who continue to make games championing extremists and terrorists. Building on Conway’s 2017 call to look anew at the nexus between violent extremism, terrorism, and the internet, we problematize existing work on the use of videogames by extremists and terrorists. First, we argue that research needs to move beyond viewing games as tools for recruitment: seeing videogames as sources of propaganda that work to reinforce the views of those already empathetic to and/or attuned to a group’s messages significantly expands our understanding of the interrelationship between players and extremist and terrorist videogames. Second, we argue that the present literature – whilst impressive – has overly privileged the “reading” of in-game representations, at the expense of attention to the central role of interactive gameplay in promoting the strategic communication and propaganda aims of a group. It is through the undertaking of in-game actions that a player comes to experience a group’s values and aims. Research on videogames, extremism and terrorism is at a nascent stage – this article seeks to provoke further thinking and open up spaces for debate in this crucial, yet under-studied, area.

22 November 2021 in Terrorism and Political Violence
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CHChamin Herath
Chamin Herath
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker
Online radicalisation to terrorism has become a pervasive policy concern over the last decade. However, as a concept it lacks clarity and empirical support. In this article, we add an empirical and theoretical lens to this problem by analysing the trajectories of 231 Islamic State terrorists. We use cluster analyses to create typologies of individuals’ different online and offline antecedent behaviours, including the ways in which they engaged in networks with co-ideologues and how they prepared for their events. The findings suggest four types of pathway within our dataset: 1) The “Integrated” pathway which has high network engagement both online and offline, mostly made up of individuals that plotted as part of a group; 2) The “Encouraged” pathway contains individuals that acted more in the online domain at the expense of offline; 3) Terrorists in the “Isolated” pathway are defined by a lack of interaction across either domain; 4) The “Enclosed” pathway encompassed actors that displayed greater offline network activity, but still utilised the Internet for planning their activity. These typologies help to move beyond the dichotomy of online or offline radicalisation; there remain few individuals that either exclusively use the Internet or do not use it at all. Rather, we can conceptualise Internet usage on a spectrum in which these four typologies all sit.

11 March 2008 in Metrika
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YDYadolah Dodge
Yadolah Dodge
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker

3 January 2021 in Criminology & Public Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JWJoe Whittaker
Joe Whittaker
Research Summary: This study offers an empirical insight into terrorists’ use of the Internet. Although criminology has previously been quiet on this topic, behavior‐based studies can aid in understanding the interactions between terrorists and their environments. Using a database of 231 US‐based Islamic State terrorists, four important findings are offered: (1) This cohort utilized the Internet heavily for the purposes of both networking with co‐ideologues and learning about their intended activity. (2) There is little reason to believe that these online interactions are replacing offline ones, as has previously been suggested. Rather, terrorists tend to operate in both domains. (3) Online activity seems to be similar across the sample, regardless of the number of co‐offenders or the sophistication of attack. (4) There is reason to believe that using the Internet may be an impediment to terrorists’ success. Policy Implications: The findings of this study have two important policy implications. First, it is vital to understand the multiplicity of environments in which terrorists inhabit. Policy makers have tended to emphasize the online domain as particularly dangerous and ripe for exploitation. While this is understandable from one perspective, simplistic and monocausal explanations for radicalization must be avoided. Terrorists operate in both the online and offline domain and there is little reason to believe that the former is replacing the latter. The two may offer different criminogenic inducements to would‐be terrorists, and at times they may be inseparably intertwined. Second, when policy responses do focus on online interventions, it is vital to understand the unintended consequences. This is particularly the case for content removal, which may inadvertently be aiding terrorists and hampering law enforcement investigations.