Concerns about public misinformation in the United States—ranging from politics to science—are growing. Here, we provide an overview of how and why citizens become (and sometimes remain) misinformed about science. Our discussion focuses specifically on misinformation among individual citizens. However, it is impossible to understand individual information processing and acceptance without taking into account social networks, information ecologies, and other macro-level variables that provide important social context. Specifically, we show how being misinformed is a function of a person’s ability and motivation to spot falsehoods, but also of other group-level and societal factors that increase the chances of citizens to be exposed to correct(ive) information. We conclude by discussing a number of research areas—some of which echo themes of the 2017 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’sCommunicating Science Effectivelyreport—that will be particularly important for our future understanding of misinformation, specifically a systems approach to the problem of misinformation, the need for more systematic analyses of science communication in new media environments, and a (re)focusing on traditionally underserved audiences.
The emergence of the 2019 novel coronavirus has led to more than a pandemic—indeed, COVID-19 is spawning myriad other concerns as it rapidly marches around the globe. One of these concerns is a surge of misinformation, which we argue should be viewed as a risk in its own right, and to which insights from decades of risk communication research must be applied. Further, when the subject of misinformation is itself a risk, as in the case of COVID-19, we argue for the utility of viewing the problem as a multi-layered risk communication problem. In such circumstances, misinformation functions as a meta-risk that interacts with and complicates publics’ perceptions of the original risk. Therefore, as the COVID-19 “misinfodemic” intensifies, risk communication research should inform the efforts of key risk communicators. To this end, we discuss the implications of risk research for efforts to fact-check COVID-19 misinformation and offer practical recommendations.
The COVID-19 pandemic went hand in hand with what some have called a “(mis)infodemic” about the virus on social media. Drawing on partisan motivated reasoning and partisan selective sharing, this study examines the influence of political viewpoints, anxiety, and the interactions of the two on believing and willingness to share false, corrective, and accurate claims about COVID-19 on social media. A large-scale 2 (emotion: anxiety vs relaxation) × 2 (slant of news outlet: MSNBC vs Fox News) experimental design with 719 US participants shows that anxiety is a driving factor in belief in and willingness to share claims of any type. Especially for Republicans, a state of heightened anxiety leads them to believe and share more claims. Our findings expand research on partisan motivated reasoning and selective sharing in online settings, and enhance the understanding of how anxiety shapes individuals’ processing of risk-related claims in issue contexts with high uncertainty.
Advances in gene editing technologies for human, plant, and animal applications have led to calls from bench and social scientists, as well as a wide variety of societal stakeholders, for broad public engagement in the decision-making about these new technologies. Unfortunately, there is limited understanding among the groups calling for public engagement on CRISPR and other emerging technologies about 1) the goals of this engagement, 2) the modes of engagement and what we know from systematic social scientific evaluations about their effectiveness, and 3) how to connect the products of these engagement exercises to societal decision or policy making. Addressing all three areas, we systematize common goals, principles, and modalities of public engagement. We evaluate empirically the likely successes of various modalities. Finally, we outline three pathways forward that deserve close attention from the scientific community as we navigate the world of Life 2.0.
Events such as the 2017 “March for Science” have brought greater attention to public attitudes toward science and scientists. Our analyses of recent poll data show that Americans’ confidence in scientists has been high for roughly 40 years (relative to other institutions), and that it is high even for controversial topics such as global warming and nuclear energy. International comparisons show broad similarities with individuals in Germany and the UK, including that trust in scientists can fluctuate depending on who employs them and what topic is under discussion. Finally, more granular analyses in the United States reveal large divides in trust based on geographic location and religious identification (i.e., rural residents exhibit comparatively low trust and the nonreligious comparatively high trust), while the gap between political partisans has been relatively small but has spiked in recent years.