Roberto Guanciale

Roberto Guanciale

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Roberto Guanciale

KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MDMads Dam
Mads Dam
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
NKNarges Khakpour
Narges Khakpour
HNHamed Nemati
Hamed Nemati
OSOliver Schwarz
Oliver Schwarz
A separation kernel simulates a distributed environment us-ing a single physical machine by executing partitions in iso-lation and appropriately controlling communication amongthem. We present a formal verication of information owsecurity for a simple separation kernel for ARMv7. Previouswork on information ow kernel security leaves communica-tion to be handled by model-external means, and cannot beused to draw conclusions when there is explicit interactionbetween partitions. We propose a dierent approach wherecommunication between partitions is made explicit and theinformation ow is analyzed in the presence of such a chan-nel. Limiting the kernel functionality as much as meaning-fully possible, we accomplish a detailed analysis and veri-cation of the system, proving its correctness at the levelof the ARMv7 assembly. As a sanity check we show howthe security condition is reduced to noninterference in thespecial case where no communication takes place. The ver-ication is done in HOL4 taking the Cambridge model ofARM as basis, transferring verication tasks on the actualassembly code to an adaptation of the BAP binary analysistool developed at CMU.Qc 20131218

1 February 2018 in Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ETEmilio Tuosto
Emilio Tuosto
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale

18 August 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
HNHamed Nemati
Hamed Nemati
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
MDMads Dam
Mads Dam
Caches pose a significant challenge to formal proofs of security for code executing on application processors, as the cache access pattern of security-critical services may leak secret information. This paper reveals a novel attack vector, exposing a low-noise cache storage channel that can be exploited by adapting well-known timing channel analysis techniques. The vector can also be used to attack various types of security-critical software such as hypervisors and application security monitors. The attack vector uses virtual aliases with mismatched memory attributes and self-modifying code to misconfigure the memory system, allowing an attacker to place incoherent copies of the same physical address into the caches and observe which addresses are stored in different levels of cache. We design and implement three different attacks using the new vector on trusted services and report on the discovery of an 128-bit key from an AES encryption service running in TrustZone on Raspberry Pi 2. Moreover, we subvert the integrity properties of an ARMv7 hypervisor that was formally verified against a cache-less model. We evaluate well-known countermeasures against the new attack vector and propose a verification methodology that allows to formally prove the effectiveness of defence mechanisms on the binary code of the trusted software.

3 November 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MBMusard Balliu
Musard Balliu
MDMads Dam
Mads Dam
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
Low level code is challenging: It lacks structure, it uses jumps and symbolic addresses, the control flow is often highly optimized, and registers and memory locations may be reused in ways that make typing extremely challenging. Information flow properties create additional complications: They are hyperproperties relating multiple executions, and the possibility of interrupts and concurrency, and use of devices and features like memory-mapped I/O requires a departure from the usual initial-state final-state account of noninterference. In this work we propose a novel approach to relational verification for machine code. Verification goals are expressed as equivalence of traces decorated with observation points. Relational verification conditions are propagated between observation points using symbolic execution, and discharged using first-order reasoning. We have implemented an automated tool that integrates with SMT solvers to automate the verification task. The tool transforms ARMv7 binaries into an intermediate, architecture-independent format using the BAP toolset by means of a verified translator. We demonstrate the capabilities of the tool on a separation kernel system call handler, which mixes hand-written assembly with gcc-optimized output, a UART device driver and a crypto service modular exponentiation routine.

14 July 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
HNHamed Nemati
Hamed Nemati
PBPablo Buiras
Pablo Buiras
ALAndreas Lindner
Andreas Lindner
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
SJSwen Jacobs
Swen Jacobs
Observational models make tractable the analysis of information flow properties by providing an abstraction of side channels. We introduce a methodology and a tool, Scam-V, to validate observational models for modern computer architectures. We combine symbolic execution, relational analysis, and different program generation techniques to generate experiments and validate the models. An experiment consists of a randomly generated program together with two inputs that are observationally equivalent according to the model under the test. Validation is done by checking indistinguishability of the two inputs on real hardware by executing the program and analyzing the side channel. We have evaluated our framework by validating models that abstract the data-cache side channel of a Raspberry Pi 3 board with a processor implementing the ARMv8-A architecture. Our results show that Scam-V can identify bugs in the implementation of the models and generate test programs which invalidate the models due to hidden microarchitectural behavior.

1 January 2006
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GFGianluigi Ferrari
Gianluigi Ferrari
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
DSDaniele Strollo
Daniele Strollo