Yidan Xing

Yidan Xing

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Yidan Xing

School of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Zhenzhe ZhengZhenzhe Zheng
Zhenzhe Zheng
WMWeichao Mao
Weichao Mao
YXYidan Xing
Yidan Xing
FWFan Wu
Fan Wu
Data is becoming an important kind of commercial good, and many online marketplaces are set up to facilitate the exchange of data. However, most existing data market models and the corresponding pricing mechanisms fail to capture the unique economic properties of data. In this paper, we first characterize the new features of IoT data as a digital commodity, and then present a market model for IoT data exchange, from an information design perspective. We further propose a family of data pricing mechanisms for maximizing revenue under different information asymmetry settings. Our MSimple mechanism extracts full surplus for the model with one type of buyer in the market. When multiple types of buyers coexist, our MGeneral mechanism optimally solves the problem of revenue maximization by formulating it as a convex program with polynomial size. For a more practical setting where buyers have bounded rationality, we design the MPractical mechanism with a tight logarithmic approximation ratio. We also show that the seller can further increase revenue by offering a free data trial to the buyers. We evaluate our pricing mechanisms on a real-world ambient sound dataset. Evaluation results demonstrate that our pricing mechanisms achieve good performance and approach the optimal revenue.

3 August 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YXYidan Xing
Yidan Xing
HZHaoqi Zhang
Haoqi Zhang
YLYangsu Liu
Yangsu Liu
DCDagui Chen
Dagui Chen
Zhenzhe ZhengZhenzhe Zheng
Zhenzhe Zheng
FWFan Wu
Fan Wu

24 August 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YXYidan Xing
Yidan Xing
Zhenzhe ZhengZhenzhe Zheng
Zhenzhe Zheng
FWFan Wu
Fan Wu
Vertical federated learning (VFL) is an emerging collaborative machine learning paradigm to facilitate the utilization of private features distributed across multiple parties. During the inference process of VFL, the involved parties need to upload their local embeddings to be aggregated for the final prediction. Despite its remarkable performances, the inference process of the current VFL system is vulnerable to the strategic behavior of involved parties, as they could easily change the uploaded local embeddings to exert direct influences on the prediction result. In a representative case study of federated recommendation, we find the allocation of display opportunities to be severely disrupted due to the parties' preferences in display content. In order to elicit the true local embeddings for VFL system, we propose a distribution-based penalty mechanism to detect and penalize the strategic behaviors in collaborative inference. As the key motivation of our design, we theoretically prove the power of constraining the distribution of uploaded embeddings in preventing the dishonest parties from achieving higher utility. Our mechanism leverages statistical two-sample tests to distinguish whether the distribution of uploaded embeddings is reasonable, and penalize the dishonest party through deactivating her uploaded embeddings. The resulted mechanism could be shown to admit truth-telling to converge to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium asymptotically under mild conditions. The experimental results further demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism to reduce the dishonest utility increase of strategic behaviors and promote the truthful uploading of local embeddings in inferences.

8 August 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YXYidan Xing
Yidan Xing
RGRui Guo
Rui Guo
YTYixin Tao
Yixin Tao
DCDagui Chen
Dagui Chen
Zhenzhe ZhengZhenzhe Zheng
Zhenzhe Zheng
FWFan Wu
Fan Wu