Evelyne Foerster

Evelyne Foerster

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Evelyne Foerster

Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, Département de Modélisation des Systèmes et Structures (DM2S), 91191, Gif-sur-Yvette, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2021 in Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhehao Zhu
Zhehao Zhu
FZFeng Zhang
Feng Zhang
QPQingyun Peng
Qingyun Peng
JDJean-Claude Dupla
Jean-Claude Dupla
JCJean Canou
Jean Canou
EFEvelyne Foerster
Evelyne Foerster

5 May 2020 in EPJ Nuclear Sciences & Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EFEvelyne Foerster
Evelyne Foerster
EREmmanuel Raimond
Emmanuel Raimond
YGYves Guigueno
Yves Guigueno
The 7th EU Framework programme project Advanced Safety Assessment Methodologies: “Extended PSA” (ASAMPSA_E, 2013–2016) was aimed at promoting good practices to extend the scope of existing Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) and the application of such “extended PSA” in decision-making in the European context. This project led to a collection of guidance reports that describe existing practices and identify their limits. Moreover, it allowed identifying some idea for further research in the framework of collaborative activities. The H2020 project “New Approach to Reactor Safety ImprovementS” (NARSIS, 2017–2021) aims at proposing some improvements to be integrated in existing PSA procedures for NPPs, considering single, cascade and combined external natural hazards (earthquakes, flooding, extreme weather, tsunamis). The project will lead to the release of various tools together with recommendations and guidelines for use in nuclear safety assessment, including a Bayesian-based multi-risk framework able to account for causes and consequences of technical, social/organizational and human aspects and a supporting Severe Accident Management decision-making tool for demonstration purposes, as well.

9 March 2020
Verified
Other
Open access
EFEvelyne Foerster
Evelyne Foerster
BBBehrooz Bazargan-Sabet
Behrooz Bazargan-Sabet
JDJames Daniell
James Daniell
PGPierre Gehl
Pierre Gehl
PVPhilip J. Vardon
Philip J. Vardon
FRFlorence Ragon
Florence Ragon
The methodology for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) has been used for decades by practitioners to better understand the most probable initiators of nuclear accidents by identifying potential accident scenarios, their consequences, and their probabilities. However, despite the remarkable reliability of the methodology, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident in Japan, which occurred in March 2011, highlighted a number of challenging issues (e.g. cascading event - cliff edge - scenarios) with respect to the application of PSA questioning the relevance of PSA practice, for such low-probability but high-consequences external events. Following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, several initiatives at the international level, have been launched in order to review current practices and identify shortcomings in scientific and technical approaches for the characterization of external natural extreme events and the evaluation of their consequences on the safety of nuclear facilities. The H2020 project “New Approach to Reactor Safety ImprovementS” (NARSIS, 2017-2021) aims at proposing some improvements to be integrated in existing PSA procedures for NPPs, considering single, cascade and combined external natural hazards (earthquakes, flooding, extreme weather, tsunamis). It coordinates the research efforts of eighteen partners encompassing leading universities, research institutes, technical support organizations (TSO), nuclear power producers and suppliers, reactor designers and operators from ten countries. The project will lead to the release of various tools together with recommendations and guidelines for use in nuclear safety assessment, including a Bayesian-based multi-risk framework able to account for causes and consequences of technical, social/organizational and human aspects and as well as a supporting Severe Accident Management decision-making tool for demonstration purposes. The NARSIS project has now been running for two years and a half, and the first set of deliverables and tools have been produced as part of the effort of the consortium. Datasets have been collected, methodologies tested, states of the art have been produced, and various criteria and plans developed. First results have started to emerge and will be presented here.

6 July 2026 in Journal of Open Source Software
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMohd Afeef Badri
Mohd Afeef Badri
GRGiuseppe Rastiello
Giuseppe Rastiello
EFEvelyne Foerster
Evelyne Foerster

23 March 2020
Verified
Other
Open access
JDJames Daniell
James Daniell
ASAndreas Schaefer
Andreas Schaefer
HWHugo Winter
Hugo Winter
PGPierre Gehl
Pierre Gehl
PVPhil Vardon
Phil Vardon
FRFlorence Ragon
Florence Ragon
Within the course of the EU project NARSIS (New Approach to Reactor Safety ImprovementS), sites of decommissioned nuclear power plants (NPPs) were investigated for external hazards using a multi-hazard approach.The starting point was a review of existing multi-hazard frameworks, as well as their application to real world locations. From this knowledge, after significant screening, external hazards were analysed at different site locations in Europe using stochastic event sets for earthquake, flood, lightning, tornadoes, tsunami, hail and other perils in order to identify key scenarios along the hazard curves. These were built from existing national and supranational stochastic event sets.The joint probability at each site of certain threshold events occurring was calculated, and relevant risk scenarios were chosen based on these hazard thresholds. Most importantly, the concept of joint operational time windows was investigated. Because the overall hazard for events is generally low, the chance of two low probability events is often screened out. However, during the damage and recovery window of these events (the operational time), the joint probabilities are much higher, thus affecting the infrastructure. Including the cascading effects, aftershocks, secondary effects and associated event sequences, provides a new insight into the probabilities of multi-hazard events and the implications for multi-risk.Historical events from the loss database CATDAT and other records are chosen where joint operational time windows have occurred to show empirical examples of joint occurrences and cascades in the past for European and international examples.Joint probabilities for significant events at decommissioned NPPs are presented within the NARSIS project and the application to multi-risk within Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA), however it is the application to other industrial types and infrastructure which shows the need for integration of multi-hazard (coinciding or cascading) events into operational management plans as well as important thought processes for building standards and use.

23 March 2020
Verified
Other
Open access
VMVarenya Kumar D. Mohan
Varenya Kumar D. Mohan
PVPhilip Vardon
Philip Vardon
JDJames Daniell
James Daniell
PGPierre Gehl
Pierre Gehl
ASAndreas Schafer
Andreas Schafer
FRFlorence Ragon
Florence Ragon
Low probability events occurring in sequence, within a limited operational time (damage and recovery window between events), are a key consideration in multi-hazard safety assessments of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Cascading effects from hazards and associated event sequences could potentially have a significant impact on risk estimates. The Bayesian network can act as a framework to consider aforementioned statistical dependencies between various hazards in multi-risk analyses of nuclear power plants.Within the EU project NARSIS (New Approach to Reactor Safety Improvements), a Bayesian network-based risk assessment framework was developed to perform multi-hazard risk assessment of NPPs.The Bayesian network method was applied for an external-event related station blackout (SBO) scenario at a NPP. Earthquake, flooding, and tornado were among the hazards considered at a decommissioned NPP site location in Europe. Both hazard dependency in time as well as a cascading scenario was also considered. The hazards, their interactions and the fragilities of selected systems, structures and components within the nuclear power plant were represented in the network and their probability distributions were obtained based on the multi-hazard and fragility approaches adopted within the NARSIS project.Sensitivity analyses in the network were used to identify key hazards and interactions. Most influential hazard combinations and ranges of intensity measures were identified through diagnostic inference in the network. Discretisation of continuous variables (hazard curves in this case) is a key aspect of performing inference in Bayesian networks. The effect of various levels of discretisation of hazard probability distributions was assessed, to identify suitable discretisations of hazard data.This application demonstrates the use and advantages of the Bayesian network methodology, developed in the NARSIS project, for probabilistic safety assessments of NPPs.