Justin Sytsma

Justin Sytsma

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Justin Sytsma

Victoria University of Wellington

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
30 September 2014 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma
JLJonathan Livengood
Jonathan Livengood
RSRyoji Sato
Ryoji Sato
MOMineki Oguchi
Mineki Oguchi

28 August 2017 in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma
KRKevin Reuter
Kevin Reuter

1 October 2021 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EFEugen Fischer
Eugen Fischer
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma
In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are 'killed' (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending 'evidentiary' experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the 'zombie argument' against materialism is built on zombie intuitions. We examine the hypothesis that contextually defeated stereotypical inferences from the noun 'zombie' influence intuitions about 'philosophical zombies'. We document framing effects ('zombie' vs 'duplicate') predicted by the hypothesis. Findings undermine intuitions about the conceivability of 'philosophical zombies' and address the philosophical 'hard problem of consciousness'. Findings support a deflationary response: The impression that principled obstacles prevent scientific explanation of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is generated by philosophical arguments that rely on epistemically deficient intuitions.

18 July 2016 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JLJonathan Livengood
Jonathan Livengood
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma
DRDavid Rose
David Rose

3 June 2020 in Synthese
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EFEugen Fischer
Eugen Fischer
Paul E. EngelhardtPaul E. Engelhardt
Paul E. Engelhardt
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma
This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language reasoning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in the wake of J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude relevant confounds. We then report an experiment that combines reading time measurements with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the root of the influential ‘argument from illusion’. Our findings support a diagnostic reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy that is in line with the ambitions of current ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.

1 August 2020 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JSJustin Sytsma
Justin Sytsma