BongNam Noh

BongNam Noh

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BongNam Noh

Chonnam National University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2016 in Digital Investigation
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KLKyoungho Lee
Kyoungho Lee
HHHyunuk Hwang
Hyunuk Hwang
KKKibom Kim
Kibom Kim
BNBongNam Noh
BongNam Noh
Memory analysis is increasingly used to collect digital evidence in incident response. With the fast growth in memory analysis, however, anti-forensic techniques appear to prevent it from performing the bootstrapping steps — operating system (OS) fingerprinting, Directory Table Base (DTB) identification, and obtaining kernel objects. Although most published research works try to solve anti forensics, they deal only with one element among the three steps. Thus, collapse in any of the three steps using the suggested robust algorithms leads to failure in the memory analysis. In this paper, we evaluate the latest memory forensic tools against anti-forensics. Then, we suggest a novel robust algorithm that guarantees the bootstrapping analysis steps. It uses only one kernel data structure called KiInitialPCR, which is a kernel global variable based on the kernel processor control region (KPCR) structure and has many fields with tolerance to mutation. We characterize the robust fields of the KPCR structure to use them for OS fingerprinting, DTB identification, and obtaining kernel objects. Then, we implement the KiInitialPCR-based analysis system. Therefore, we can analyze the compromised memory in spite of the interference of anti-forensics.

1 September 2006
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JPJun-Hyung Park
Jun-Hyung Park
MKMin-Soo Kim
Min-Soo Kim
BNBong-Nam Noh
Bong-Nam Noh
JJJames B D Joshi
James B D Joshi
With the rapidly increasing complexity of computer systems and the sophistication of hacking tools and techniques, there is a crucial need for computer forensic analysis techniques. Very few techniques exist to support forensic analysis of unknown executable files. The existing techniques primarily inspect executable files to detect known signatures or are based on metadata information. A key goal of such forensic investigation is to identify malicious executable files that hackers might have installed in a targeted system. Finding such malware in a compromised system is difficult because it is hard to identify the purpose of the fragments of executable files. In this paper, we present a similarity-based technique that analyzes targeted executable files to identify a malware present in a compromised system. The technique involves assigning a similarity value to the fragments of executable files present in a compromised hard disk against a set of source files. We present some results based on the comparison of assembly instruction sequences of well-known hacking tools with those of various executable files, and suggest various ways to reduce the false positives

31 December 2010 in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DHDoYoon Ha
DoYoon Ha
CLChangYong Lee
ChangYong Lee
HJHyunCheol Jeong
HyunCheol Jeong
BNBongNam Noh
BongNam Noh