This paper discusses the role of the electoral system in making the Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominant. Drawing on Sartori’s framework, we first clarify the concept of a predominant party system. Second, we examine the impact of the electoral system on the emergence of a predominant party system in Turkey. Analysing election results, we argue that the electoral system fosters dominance in three ways. First, a combination of electoral formula, national threshold and district threshold leads to over‐representation of large parties and under‐representation of small ones. Second, the fear of a wasted vote due to the high threshold prompts voters to support their second‐best option, which concentrates the votes among large parties. Finally, the electoral system increases electoral turnout rates by extending polarization.
This paper re-evaluates the party system change in Turkey based on Sartori’s framework. It also explores the role of opposition parties in this. The paper suggests that, while a fragmented opposition may lead to the emergence of a one-party government and/or military intervention because of the high levels of polarization it induces, bilateral opposition prolongs one-party governments. The paper relies on an analysis of party programs and public opinion surveys in order to position the parties in terms of spatial distance and to understand the level of polarization.
11 October 2021 in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
This article has two major aims. First, it sketches out the party model change in Turkey. Second, it highlights how the AKP’s authoritarian turn has affected its model of organization. On the former, it argues that the cadre parties of the early republic tended to turn into the mix of class-based mass parties and catch-all parties in the post-1960 period. The mass party tradition was maintained among ethnic and religion-based parties in the post-1980 period while social democrat parties, as well as centre-right parties, mixed catch-all and cartel party characteristics. On the latter, we argue that the AKP’s authoritarian drift has very well been reflected upon its organizational model which shifted from the combination of a mass party and catch-all party to a mixture of cadre and electoral-professional party models.
This article explores the interplay between populism and crisis from a comparative perspective. While the dominant literature largely takes crisis for granted, and thus neglects its underlying nature, we undertake a detailed investigation of the crisis of representation in Turkey and the 2009 Greek crisis. Adapting Benjamin Moffitt’s model of the populist performance of crisis to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Turkey) and Tsipras’ Syriza (Greece), we argue, first, that the ideological core of populist parties plays a crucial role in almost all stages of the populist performance of crisis. Second, we show that structural political – economic conditions put certain limits on the populist performance of crisis. Finally, we suggest that Moffitt’s model needs to be revised in light of our findings.
2007-2008 finansallaşmış kapitalist krizin patlak vermesinin ardından Avrupa’da birçok hükümet, kriz yönetim stratejisi olarak kemer sıkmayı benimsemiştir. Ancak kemer sıkma, erken beklentilerin aksine, iktisadi ve sosyal durumu ağırlaştırarak birçok ülkede geleneksel siyasi ayarları alt üst etmiştir. Özellikle Güney Avrupa’da bu siyasi krizin izlerini sürmek mümkün olmakla birlikte, gelişmiş kapitalist bir ülke olmasına rağmen Fransa’da meydana gelen siyasi paradigma değişikliği, oldukça istisnai bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Bu bağlamda kemer sıkma çağında Fransa’da radikal sol FG ve FI ile radikal sağ FN, sırasıyla, PS ve UMP’nin ulusal parti sistemi üzerindeki hegemonyasını sona erdirmiştir. Ne var ki radikal aktörlerin eş zamanlı yükselişine rağmen literatürde ilkine yönelik ilgi zayıf düzeyde kalmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, Fransız solunda son yıllarda belirgin hale gelen yeniden gruplaşma eğiliminin temel nedenleri analiz edilmektedir. Spesifik olarak, yapısal politik ekonomik koşullar, toplumsal hareketlilik ve toplumsal protesto dinamikleri ile politik kurumsal koşulların sol rekabete etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Araştırmada PS’nin 1990’larda Üçüncü Yol akımına eklemlenmesinin ardından geleneksel programına yabancılaşarak yükselen krizlere yanıt verememesi ile Hollande döneminde ana akım kriz yönetim stratejisine eklemlenerek kemer sıkma politikaları izlemesinin radikal sol partilerin yükselişini tetiklediği savunulmaktadır. Bununla birlikte kemer sıkma karşıtı zayıf toplumsal hareketlilik ile FN’nin kamusal söylemi tayin eder hale gelmesi, söz konusu aktörlerin seçim başarılarını kayda değer biçimde sınırlandırmıştır.