29 October 2022 in Minds and Machines
With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural (‘SLEEC’) nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications of autonomous agents requires the refinement of normative principles into explicitly formulated practical rules. This paper develops a process for deriving specification rules from a set of high-level norms, thereby bridging the gap between normative principles and operational practice. This enables autonomous agents to select and execute the most normatively favourable action in the intended context premised on a range of underlying relevant normative principles. In the translation and reduction of normative principles to SLEEC rules, we present an iterative process that uncovers normative principles, addresses SLEEC concerns, identifies and resolves SLEEC conflicts, and generates both preliminary and complex normatively-relevant rules, thereby guiding the development of autonomous agents and better positioning them as normatively SLEEC-sensitive or SLEEC-compliant.
16 December 2011 in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
In Bancoult, a majority of the House of Lords upheld the British government's use of the royal prerogative to expel the population of the Chagos Islands from their homeland. The majority acknowledged that the government's treatment of the Chagossians was disturbing, but held that the law left them with no choice but to hold the orders valid. In this article, I draw a parallel between this decision and the 18th-century judicial response to the Zong affair—where over a hundred slaves were thrown off a ship to drown in the sea. Both decisions are cloaked in formalist rhetoric but, as I show through an examination of the law as it stood prior to each of the decisions, the actual legal reasoning in both decisions is so without basis as to be unsustainable on any formalist or legalist account. Rather, the decision in Bancoult, like the decision in the Zong, shows all the hallmarks of being a purely pragmatic one, prompted by broader concerns as to the practical impact of a contrary decision and the precedent it would set. The inherent limitations of this mode of judicial reasoning make its deployment in Bancoult troubling.
27 January 2010 in International and Comparative Law Quarterly
This article examines the problem of divergent judicial interpretation of harmonized documents. Drawing on the experience of harmonization of the law of arbitration, it points out that divergent interpretation runs much deeper than is commonly assumed, and shows strong similarities to the ‘transplant effect’ discussed in the literature on legal transplants. The article examines why the transplant effect shows up in harmonization, and considers its importance for the eventual success or failure of harmonization projects.
1 March 2010 in Legal Studies
17 March 2020 in Medical Law Review
Over time, medical law has moved away from paternalism in favour of an approach grounded in patients’ rights. Using Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) as a case study, we offer a deeper analysis of this emerging approach. We argue that patients’ rights should be evaluated in terms of their contribution to making medical law more socially responsive, by developing it to give effect to social needs and aspirations pertaining to health care. Although rights can play an important role in achieving social responsiveness, they also carry the risk of entrenching approaches unrepresentative of patients’ actual needs and empirical realities. This is evident in Montgomery, where the law, despite being derived from General Medical Council (GMC) guidance, has effects that differ significantly from the GMC’s goals. Drawing on socio-legal literature, we outline a new approach for guiding the use of rights in medical law focused on the functional consequences of rights in facilitating patients’ aspirations, and the capacity of rights to respond to social and institutional contexts in which medical interaction occurs. We conclude by showing how this approach, applied to informed consent, would produce a different and arguably a superior duty, providing a sounder basis for responding to patient needs.
1 September 2015 in Legal Studies
The aim of this paper is to reframe the taxonomy debate which has, in recent years, come to dominate private law theory. We argue that the debate to date has been flawed by two fundamental mistakes. First, little attention has been paid to how legal taxonomies are actually used. This, we argue, is regrettable: how we build a taxonomy depends on why we build a taxonomy, and a clearer focus on this question produces an approach that is very different from the approaches that currently dominate private law theory. Secondly, both sides in the debate have misunderstood what legal concepts are, and hence tend to misuse them. We argue that legal concepts are Weberian ideal types, and use philosophical theories of concepts to put forward a very different understanding of how concepts acquire content and are used in the legal system. Putting these together, we argue for a far more developmental, and historically informed, approach to taxonomy and to legal concepts generally.