6 January 2021 in Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience
How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.
8 December 2023 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards involve both cognitive and physical effort, though the mechanistic relationship between them is not yet understood. Here, we use an individual differences approach to isolate and measure the computational processes underlying effort-based decisions and test the association between cognitive and physical domains. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into patch foraging, to quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort indirectly, by their effects on foraging choices. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants’ exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. The indirect sequential choice style revealed effort-seeking behavior in a minority of participants (preferring high over low effort) that has apparently been missed by many previous approaches. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common. We used canonical correlation analysis to probe the relationship of task measures to self-reported affect and motivation, and found correlations of cognitive effort with anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy, but no similar correlations with physical effort.
1 November 2024 in Psychological Medicine
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity.Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N = 52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N = 27).Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures was related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e. performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds.Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving threshold associations with symptom severity are consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.
16 January 2025 in The Journal of Neuroscience
Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives suggests causal involvement of the frontopolar cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC's role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within-subject design, 46 participants (36 female, 8 male, 1 “neither/other”) received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., exhibited lower exit thresholds) when traveling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions, and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications.
20 February 2020 in PsyArXiv
How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a given situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to other situations with shared features, even when the demands for cognitive control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could, under some circumstances, cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially over-exert control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). However only one of these tasks was rewarded, it changed from trial to trial, and could be predicted by one or more of the stimulus features (the color and/or the word). Participants first learned colors that predicted the rewarded task. Then they learned words that predicted the rewarded task. In the third part of the experiment, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli the transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color naming, which would require the exertion of control, even though the actually rewarded task was word reading and therefore did not require the engagement of control. Our results demonstrated that participants over-exerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.
20 February 2024 in medRxiv
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity. Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N=52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N=27). Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures were related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e., performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds. Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving thresholds associations with symptom severity is consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.