Weining Zhang

Weining Zhang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Weining Zhang

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
15 June 2024 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MMMohamed Mekhaimer
Mohamed Mekhaimer
MSMarwa Soliman
Marwa Soliman
WZWeining Zhang
Weining Zhang
We examine the relation between political uncertainty and narrative disclosure complexity in conference calls. Using firm-level political uncertainty, we find that political uncertainty is positively associated with firms’ disclosures complexity as measured by the Fog index. Decomposing complexity into two latent components—information and obfuscation—we show that political uncertainty significantly increases the obfuscation but has no impact on the information. Further analysis reveals that complex disclosure is motivated by expected poor future performance amid political uncertainty. We also show that, during periods of heightened political uncertainty, obfuscated disclosure is associated with reduced earnings informativeness, increased dispersion in analyst forecasts, and higher volatility in forecast revisions. These findings are robust to including and excluding sentences containing complex political bigrams when calculating Fog. Further evidence shows that, during periods of political uncertainty, managers tend to use a more ambiguous tone and provide scripted and shorter (longer) responses to analysts’ questions (presentations).

1 February 2013 in Accounting Horizons
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MEMichael Ettredge
Michael Ettredge
YHYing Huang
Ying Huang
WZWeining Zhang
Weining Zhang
SYNOPSIS: We examine the impact of financial restatements on managers' subsequent earnings forecasts. We argue that restatements create conflicting incentives. One incentive is to repair manager reputations as information providers by providing more and better guidance via earnings forecasts. The opposing incentive is to avoid risk by reducing the information in forecasts. We find that compared to control firms, restatement companies exhibit a decreased propensity to issue quarterly earnings forecasts following restatements. Those that do make forecasts issue fewer forecasts in post-restatement periods. We also find that post-restatement forecasts are less precise, and are less optimistically biased. Overall, our results suggest that, rather than increasing voluntary disclosure in the form of forecasts, managers of restatement companies exhibit risk-averting forecasting behavior following restatements.

17 April 2024 in Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
QYQi Yun
Qi Yun
SMSi-Fei Ma
Si-Fei Ma
WZWei-Ning Zhang
Wei-Ning Zhang
WXWen Hui Xia
Wen Hui Xia
JWJia Wang
Jia Wang
An increasing body of research suggests that promoting microglial autophagy hinders the neuroinflammation initiated though the NLRP3 inflammasome activation in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The function of FoxG1, a crucial transcription factor involved in cell survival by regulating mitochondrial function, remains unknown during the AD process and neuroinflammation occurs. In the present study, we firstly found that Aβ peptides induced AD-like neuroinflammation upregulation and downregulated the level of autophagy. Following low-dose Aβ25–35 stimulation, FoxG1 expression and autophagy exhibited a gradual increase. Nevertheless, with high-concentration Aβ25–35 treatment, progressive decrease in FoxG1 expression and autophagy levels as the concentration of Aβ25–35 escalated. In addition, FoxG1 has a positive effect on cell viability and autophagy in the nervous system. In parallel with the Aβ25–35 stimulation, we employed siRNA to decrease the expression of FoxG1 in N2A cells. A substantial reduction in autophagy level (Beclin1, LC3II, SQSTM1/P62) and a notable growth in inflammatory response (NLRP3, TNF-α, and IL-6) were observed. In addition, we found FoxG1 overexpression owned the effect on the activation of AMPK/mTOR autophagy pathway and siRNA-FoxG1 successfully abolished this effect. Lastly, FoxG1 suppressed the NLRP3 inflammasome and enhanced the cognitive function in AD-like mouse model induced by Aβ25–35. Confirmed by cellular and animal experiments, FoxG1 suppressed NLRP3-mediated neuroinflammation, which was strongly linked to autophagy regulated by AMPK/mTOR. Taken together, FoxG1 may be a critical node in the pathologic progression of AD and has the potential to serve as therapeutic target.

5 February 2024 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JHJiapeng He
Jiapeng He
KLKevin Li
Kevin Li
NLNingzhong Li
Ningzhong Li
WZWeining Zhang
Weining Zhang
We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for contractors and that this effect strengthens when the contracts entail higher proprietary information cost for contractors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K4; M4.

27 May 2025 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RBRobert Bushman
Robert Bushman
ZDZhonglan Dai
Zhonglan Dai
WZWeining Zhang
Weining Zhang
We conceptualize equity incentive contracting as a dynamic process in which contracting frictions limit the speed at which equity incentives adjust to target levels. Slower adjustment speeds imply more prolonged deviations from value-maximizing targets and thus more severe negative effects on future performance. We find that contracting frictions significantly slow the speed of adjustment to target incentives (SOA). Consistent with frictions prolonging the persistence of deviations from target, we find that contracting frictions magnify the negative influence of deviations on future firm performance. Further, we find that the influence of contracting frictions on SOA operates through boards’ equity grant decisions. Our dynamic contracting perspective offers new insight into the relation between CEO incentives and firm performance by providing novel evidence that the speed of convergence to target incentives is a defining feature of the dynamic contracting process that translates inefficiency effects of contracting frictions into lower future performance. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text. JEL Classifications: M41.