SUMMARY: Despite SOX enhancing the requirements of audit committee (AC) members, AC members are perceived to be inactively involved or lacking timely information about accounting issues. However, when lead independent directors (LIDs) serve on ACs, they bring the ability to ensure timely sharing of and improved awareness of accounting issues among the AC members, the external auditor, and managers, strengthening AC effectiveness. When considering the broad cross-section of companies with LIDs on the AC, we find that they produce more reliable and timely financial information, especially companies with large ACs or whose CEO tenure is short. However, examining subsamples of companies with/without CEO duality, the effect differs for individual companies, suggesting weaker results when there is CEO duality and benefits of having LIDs on other committees. A path analysis suggests that LIDs on the AC lead to a lower likelihood of CEO-forced turnover because of their favorable influence on financial reporting. Data Availability: All the data used in this paper, including financial statements, annual reports, and regulatory filings, are sourced from publicly available financial databases and regulatory filings. JEL Classifications: G30; M41; M42.
24 May 2025 in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
SUMMARY: In this paper, we examine the challenges in auditing information technology (IT)-enabled financial reporting by analyzing PCAOB inspection reports for the years 2019–2024. Despite increased regulatory efforts to enhance audit quality, recent PCAOB inspection findings still reveal recurring deficiencies in public company audits, suggesting diminished audit quality. Our review of PCAOB inspection reports indicates that audit deficiencies related to IT and accounting information systems, such as deficiencies in testing automated controls and using system-generated data as audit evidence, persist and remain challenging to address. These findings are critical as more companies adopt advanced technologies in their financial reporting processes. This paper provides valuable insights into how evolving IT may heighten the complexity of audit engagements and proposes recommendations to enhance audit quality in this rapidly evolving IT environment. Data Availability: All data used in this paper are publicly available. JEL Classifications: G38; M42; M48.
Following SOX, regulators emphasized the role of corporate attorneys in safeguarding the integrity of public company disclosures. At the same time, general counsels (GCs) have increasingly been appointed to top management positions, where they serve not only as legal advisors but also as strategic decision-makers. We examine whether the presence of a GC in top management affects the narratives in the earnings announcements, an important source of soft information in capital markets. Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2006 to 2019, we find that firms with GCs in top management exhibit significantly more conservative tone in earnings announcements relative to firms without GCs in top management. This effect is driven by a greater use of negative words rather than a reduction in positive words. Despite this more conservative tone, we find no evidence that GC presence weakens the association between tone and contemporaneous market reactions or future firm performance. We further find that earnings announcements of GC firms are less readable and that GC presence is associated with lower subsequent litigation risk. Overall, our findings suggest that GCs in top management are associated with more conservative narrative disclosure without reducing the capital market relevance of tone.