Paul Barford

Paul Barford

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Paul Barford

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 March 2007
Verified
Book Chapter
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PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran

10 June 2003 in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
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Journal Article
Open access
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran
PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
JUJohannes Ullrich
Johannes Ullrich
Network intrusions have been a fact of life in the Internet for many years. However, as is the case with many other types of Internet-wide phenomena, gaining insight into the global characteristics of intrusions is challenging. In this paper we address this problem by systematically analyzing a set of firewall logs collected over four months from over 1600 different networks world wide. The first part of our study is a general analysis focused on the issues of distribution, categorization and prevalence of intrusions. Our data shows both a large quantity and wide variety of intrusion attempts on a daily basis. We also find that worms like CodeRed, Nimda and SQL Snake persist long after their original release. By projecting intrusion activity as seen in our data sets to the entire Internet we determine that there are typically on the order of 25B intrusion attempts per day and that there is an increasing trend over our measurement period. We further find that sources of intrusions are uniformly spread across the Autonomous System space. However, deeper investigation reveals that a very small collection of sources are responsible for a significant fraction of intrusion attempts in any given month and their on/off patterns exhibit cliques of correlated behavior. We show that the distribution of source IP addresses of the non-worm intrusions as a function of the number of attempts follows Zipf's law. We also find that at daily timescales, intrusion targets often depict significant spatial trends that blur patterns observed from individual "IP telescopes"; this underscores the necessity for a more global approach to intrusion detection. Finally, we investigate the benefits of shared information, and the potential for using this as a foundation for an automated, global intrusion detection framework that would identify and isolate intrusions with greater precision and robustness than systems with limited perspective.

30 September 2009
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Book Chapter
Closed access
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PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
YCYan Chen
Yan Chen
AGAnup Goyal
Anup Goyal
ZLZhichun Li
Zhichun Li
VPVern Paxson
Vern Paxson
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran

13 January 2007 in Microprocessors and Microsystems
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Journal Article
Closed access
JSJoel Sommers
Joel Sommers
PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
WWWalter Willinger
Walter Willinger

1 May 2007
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
VYVinod Yegneswaran
Vinod Yegneswaran
CAChris Alfeld
Chris Alfeld
PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
JCJin-Yi Cai
Jin-Yi Cai
Over the past several years, honeynets have proven invaluable for understanding the characteristics of unwanted Internet traffic from misconfigurations and malicious attacks. In this paper, we address the problem of defending honeynets against systematic mapping by malicious parties, so we can ensure that honeynets remain viable in the long term. Our approach is based on two ideas: (i) counting the number of probes received in the honeynet, and (ii) shuffling the location of live systems with those that comprise the honeynet in a larger address space after the probe count has exceeded a threshold. We describe four different strategies for randomizing the location of the honeynet. Each strategy is defined in terms of the degree of defense that it provides and its associated computational and state requirements. We implement a prototype middlebox that we call kaleidoscope to gain practical insight on the feasibility of these strategies. Through a series of tests we show that the system is capable of effectively defending honeynets in large networks with limited impact on normal traffic, and that it continues to respond well in the face of large resource attacks.

7 December 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
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Journal Article
Open access
ECEsteban Carisimo
Esteban Carisimo
CWCaleb J. Wang
Caleb J. Wang
MWMia Weaver
Mia Weaver
FBFabián E. Bustamante
Fabián E. Bustamante
PBPaul Barford
Paul Barford
We present a longitudinal study of intercontinental long-haul links (LHLs) - links with latencies significantly higher than that of all other links in a traceroute path. Our study is motivated by the recognition of these LHLs as a network-layer manifestation of critical transoceanic undersea cables. We present a methodology and associated processing system for identifying long-haul links in traceroute measurements. We apply this system to a large corpus of traceroute data and report on multiple aspects of long haul connectivity including country-level prevalence, routers as international gateways, preferred long-haul destinations, and the evolution of these characteristics over a 7 year period. We identify 85,620 layer-3 links (out of 2.7M links in a large traceroute dataset) that satisfy our definition for intercontinental long haul with many of them terminating in a relatively small number of nodes. An analysis of connected components shows a clearly dominant component with a relative size that remains stable despite a significant growth of the long-haul infrastructure.