Chongyan Gu

Chongyan Gu

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Chongyan Gu

Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queens University Belfast, Belfast, U.K.

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 July 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YZYue Zheng
Yue Zheng
Wenye LiuWenye Liu
Wenye Liu
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
Chip Hong ChangChip Hong Chang
Chip Hong Chang
Peer to Peer (P2P) or direct connection IoT has become increasingly popular owing to its lower latency and higher privacy compared to database-driven or server-based IoT. However, wireless vulnerabilities raise severe concerns on IoT device-to-device communication. This is further aggravated by the challenge to achieve lightweight direct mutual authentication and secure key exchange between IoT peer nodes in P2P IoT applications. Physical unclonable function (PUF) is a key enabler to lightweight, low-power and secure authentication of resource-constrained devices in IoT. Nevertheless, current PUF-enabled authentication protocols, with or without the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of each of its interlocutors stored in the verifier's side, are incompatible for P2P IoT scenarios due to the security, storage and computing power limitations of IoT devices. To solve this problem, a new lightweight PUF-based mutual authentication and key exchange protocol is proposed. It allows two resource-constrained PUF embedded endpoint devices to authenticate each other directly without the need for local storage of CRPs or any private secrets, and simultaneously establish the session key for secure data exchange without resorting to the public-key algorithm. The proposed protocol is evaluated using the game-based formal security analysis method as well as the automatic security analysis tool ProVerif to corroborate its mutual authenticity, secrecy, and resistance against replay and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Using two Avnet Ultra96-V2 boards to emulate the two IoT endpoint devices, a physical prototype system is also constructed to demonstrate and validate the feasibility of the proposed secure P2P connection scheme. A comparative analysis shows that the proposed protocol outperforms related protocols in terms of security features, computational complexity as well as communication and storage costs.

5 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
WLWeiqiang Liu
Weiqiang Liu
YCYIJUN CUI
YIJUN CUI
NHNeil Hanley
Neil Hanley
MOMaire OrNeill
Maire OrNeill
MOMaire O'Neill
Maire O'Neill
The PUF is a physical security primitive that permits to extract intrinsic digital identifiers from electronic devices. As low-cost nature PUF is a promising candidate to meet security in lightweight devices for IoT application. The Arbiter PUF or APUF has been widely studied in the technical literature. However it often suffers from disadvantages such as poor uniqueness and reliability, particularly when implemented on FPGAs due to features such as physical layout restrictions. To address these problems, a new design known as the FF-APUF has been proposed; it offers a compact architecture, combined with good uniqueness and reliability, as well as suitable for FPGA implementation. Many PUF designs have been shown to be vulnerable to ML based modeling attacks. In this paper, it is initially shown that the FF-APUF design requires more efforts than a conventional APUF design for the adversary to attack. A comprehensive analysis of the experimental results for the FF-APUF design is also presented. An improved APUF design with a balanced arbiter and a FF-APUF design are proposed and implemented on the Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA at 28 nm technology. The experimental min-entropy of the FF-APUF design across different devices is more than twice of a conventional APUF design.

10 November 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
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Journal Article
Closed access
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
Chip Hong ChangChip Hong Chang
Chip Hong Chang
WLWeiqiang Liu
Weiqiang Liu
SYShichao Yu
Shichao Yu
YWYale Wang
Yale Wang
MOMaire O'NEill
Maire O'NEill
Silicon physical unclonable function (PUF) has emerged as a promising spoof-proof solution for low-cost device authentication. Due to practical constraints in preventing phishing through public network or insecure communication channels, simple PUF-based authentication protocol with unrestricted queries and transparent responses is vulnerable to modeling and replay attacks. Although PUF itself is lightweight, the ancillary cryptographic primitives required to support secure handshaking in classical PUF-based authentication protocol is not necessarily so. In this paper, we present a modeling attack resistant PUFbased mutual authentication scheme to mitigate the practical limitations in applications where a resource-rich server authenticates a device with no strong restriction imposed on the type of PUF design or any additional protection on the binary channel used for the authentication. Our scheme uses an active deception protocol to prevent machine learning (ML) attacks on a device with a monolithic integration of a genuine Strong PUF (SPUF), a fake PUF, a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), a register, a binary counter, a comparator and a simple controller. The hardware encapsulation makes collection of challenge response pairs (CRPs) easy for model building during enrollment but prohibitively time-consuming upon device deployment through the same interface. A genuine server can perform a mutual authentication with the device using a combined fresh challenge contributed by both the server and the device. The message exchanged in clear cannot be manipulated by the adversary to derive unused authentic CRPs. The adversary will have to either wait for an impractically long time to collect enough real CRPs by directly querying the device or the ML model derived from the collected CRPs will be poisoned to expose the imposer when it is used to perform a spoofing attack. The false PUF multiplexing is fortified against prediction of waiting time by doubling the time penalty for every unsuccessful guess. Our implementation results on field programmable gate array (FPGA) device and security analysis have corroborated the low hardware overheads and attack resistance of the proposed deception protoco.

27 May 2017 in ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
NHNeil Hanley
Neil Hanley
MOMáire O'NEill
Máire O'NEill
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), a form of physical security primitive, enable digital identifiers to be extracted from devices, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Many PUF implementations have been proposed to generate these unique n -bit binary strings. However, they often offer insufficient uniqueness and reliability when implemented on FPGAs and can consume excessive resources. To address these problems, in this article we present an efficient, lightweight, and scalable PUF identification (ID) generator circuit that offers a compact design with good uniqueness and reliability properties and is specifically designed for FPGAs. A novel post-characterisation methodology is also proposed that improves the reliability of a PUF without the need for any additional hardware resources. Moreover, the proposed post-characterisation method can be generally used for any FPGA-based PUF designs. The PUF ID generator consumes 8.95% of the hardware resources of a low-cost Xilinx Spartan-6 LX9 FPGA and 0.81% of a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA. Experimental results show good uniqueness, reliability, and uniformity with no occurrence of bit-aliasing. In particular, the reliability of the PUF is close to 100% over an environmental temperature range of 25°C to 70°C with ± 10% variation in the supply voltage.

29 October 2020 in Proceedings of the IEEE
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWeiqiang Liu
Weiqiang Liu
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
MOMaire O'Neill
Maire O'Neill
GQGang Qu
Gang Qu
PMPaolo Montuschi
Paolo Montuschi
FLFabrizio Lombardi
Fabrizio Lombardi
Approximate computing is an advanced computational technique that trades the accuracy of computation results for better utilization of system resources. It has emerged as a new preferable paradigm over traditional computing architectures for many applications where inaccurate results are acceptable. However, approximate computing also introduces security vulnerabilities mainly due to the fact that the uncertain and unpredictable intrinsic errors during approximate execution may be indistinguishable from malicious modification of the input data, the execution process, and the results. On the other hand, interestingly, approximate computing presents new opportunities to secure the system and the computation. Existing work on the security of approximate computing covers threat models, countermeasures, and evaluations but lacks a framework for analysis and comparison. In this article, we provide a classification of the state-of-the-art works in this research field, including threat models in approximate computing and promising security approaches using approximate computing. Open questions and potential future research directions are also discussed.

5 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SYShichao Yu
Shichao Yu
CGChongyan Gu
Chongyan Gu
WLWeiqiang Liu
Weiqiang Liu
MOMaire O'NEill
Maire O'NEill
With the globalization of the semiconductor industry, hardware Trojans(HTs) are an emergent security threat in modern integrated circuit(IC) production. Research is now being conducted into designing more accurate and efficient methods to detect HTs. Recently, a number of ML-based HT detection approaches have been proposed; however, most of them still use knowledge-driven approaches to design features and often use engineering intuition to carefully craft the detection model to improve accuracy. Therefore, in this work, we propose a data-driven HT detection system based on gate-level netlists. The system consists of four main parts: 1)Information extraction from netlist block; 2)Natural language processing(NLP) for translating netlist information; 3)DL-based HT detection model; 4)HT component final voter. In the experiments, both a long short-term memory networks(LSTM) model and convolutional neural network(CNN) model are used as our detection models. We performed the experiments on the HT benchmarks from Trust-hub and evaluated different parameter settings in the training procedure. The experimental results show that the proposed HT detection system can achieve 79.29% TPR, 99.97% TNR, 87.75% PPV and 99.94% NPV for combinational Trojan detection and 93.46% TPR, 99.99% TNR, 98.92% PPV and 99.92% NPV for sequential Trojan detection after voting-based optimization using the LEDA library-based HT benchmarks.