Jesse Elwell

Jesse Elwell

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Jesse Elwell

Peraton Labs, Basking Ridge, New Jersey, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 April 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DEDmitry Evtyushkin
Dmitry Evtyushkin
TBThomas Benjamin
Thomas Benjamin
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
JEJeffrey A. Eitel
Jeffrey A. Eitel
ASAngelo Sapello
Angelo Sapello
AGAbhrajit Ghosh
Abhrajit Ghosh
Side-channel attacks such as Spectre rely on properties of modern CPUs that permit discovery of microarchitectural state via timing of various operations. The Weird Machine concept is an increasingly popular model for characterization of emergent execution that arises from side-effects of conventional computing constructs. In this work we introduce Microarchitectural Weird Machines (µWM): code constructions that allow performing computation through the means of side effects and conflicts between microarchitectual entities such as branch predictors and caches. The results of such computations are observed as timing variations. We demonstrate how µWMs can be used as a powerful obfuscation engine where computation operates based on events unobservable to conventional anti-obfuscation tools based on emulation, debugging, static and dynamic analysis techniques. We demonstrate that µWMs can be used to reliably perform arbitrary computation by implementing a SHA-1 hash function. We then present a practical example in which we use a µWM to obfuscate malware code such that its passive operation is invisible to an observer with full power to view the architectural state of the system until the code receives a trigger. When the trigger is received the malware decrypts and executes its payload. To show the effectiveness of obfuscation we demonstrate its use in the concealment and subsequent execution of a payload that exfiltrates a shadow password file, and a payload that creates a reverse shell.

28 July 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DEDmitry Evtyushkin
Dmitry Evtyushkin
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
MOMeltem Ozsoy
Meltem Ozsoy
DPDmitry Ponomarev
Dmitry Ponomarev
NGNael Abu Ghazaleh
Nael Abu Ghazaleh
RRRyan Riley
Ryan Riley
We consider the problem of how to provide an execution environment where the application's secrets are safe even in the presence of malicious system software layers. We propose Iso-X-a flexible, fine-grained hardware-supported framework that provides isolation for security-critical pieces of an application such that they can execute securely even in the presence of untrusted system software. Isolation in Iso-X is achieved by creating and dynamically managing compartments (isolated software modules) to host critical fragments of code and associated data. Iso-X provides fine-grained isolation at the memory-page level, flexible allocation of memory, and a low-complexity, hardware-only trusted computing base. Iso-X requires minimal additional hardware, a small number of new ISA instructions to manage compartments, and minimal changes to the operating system which need not be in the trusted computing base. The run-time performance overhead of Iso-X is negligible and even the overhead of creating and destroying compartments is modest. An FPGA implementation of Iso-X runtime mechanisms shows a negligible impact on the processor cycle time.

8 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
LWLan Wang
Lan Wang
ALAlexander Lane
Alexander Lane
CSConstantin Serban
Constantin Serban
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
AAAlex Afanasyev
Alex Afanasyev
LZLixia Zhang
Lixia Zhang
Although multiple routing protocols and forwarding strategies have been proposed for NDN, there is a lack of understanding about the synergy between them. In this work, we investigate the effectiveness of NDN forwarding strategy, routing, and the combination of the two in maximizing data fetching success in the face of network failures. Through emulation experiments, we first evaluate the ASF (Adaptive SRTT-based Forwarding) strategy and NLSR (Named-data Link State Routing) protocol separately. Our results show that ASF with static routing outperforms NLSR with best-route strategy in most cases, although its data delivery performance exhibits a bias toward popular producers. We then conduct experiments that combine ASF and NLSR. The results show that the combination of ASF with frequent probing and NLSR with slow routing adaptation leads to better data delivery performance than using either ASF or NLSR alone. Our results provide insights into the future design and deployment of routing and forwarding strategies in NDN networks.

1 February 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
RRRyan Riley
Ryan Riley
NANael Abu-Ghazaleh
Nael Abu-Ghazaleh
DPDmitry Ponomarev
Dmitry Ponomarev
Protecting modern computer systems and complex software stacks against the growing range of possible attacks is becoming increasingly difficult. The architecture of modern commodity systems allows attackers to subvert privileged system software often using a single exploit. Once the system is compromised, inclusive permissions used by current architectures and operating systems easily allow a compromised high-privileged software layer to perform arbitrary malicious activities, even on behalf of other software layers. This paper presents a hardware-supported page permission scheme for the physical pages that is based on the concept of non-inclusive sets of memory permissions for different layers of system software such as hypervisors, operating systems, and user-level applications. Instead of viewing privilege levels as an ordered hierarchy with each successive level being more privileged, we view them as distinct levels each with its own set of permissions. Such a permission mechanism, implemented as part of a processor architecture, provides a common framework for defending against a range of recent attacks. We demonstrate that such a protection can be achieved with negligible performance overhead, low hardware complexity and minimal changes to the commodity OS and hypervisor code.

8 December 2015 in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
RRRyan Riley
Ryan Riley
NANael Abu-Ghazaleh
Nael Abu-Ghazaleh
DPDmitry Ponomarev
Dmitry Ponomarev
ICIliano Cervesato
Iliano Cervesato
The inclusive permissions structure (e.g., the Intel ring model) of modern commodity CPUs provides privileged system software layers with arbitrary permissions to access and modify client processes, allowing them to manage these clients and the system resources efficiently. Unfortunately, these inclusive permissions allow a compromised high-privileged software layer to perform arbitrary malicious activities. In this article, our goal is to prevent attacks that cross system layers while maintaining the abilities of system software to manage the system and allocate resources. In particular, we present a hardware-supported page permission framework for physical pages that is based on the concept of noninclusive sets of memory permissions for different layers of system software (such as hypervisors, operating systems, and user-level applications). Instead of viewing privilege levels as an ordered hierarchy with each successive level being more privileged, we view them as distinct levels each with its own set of permissions. In order to enable system software to manage client processes, we define a set of legal permission transitions that support resource allocation but preserve security. We show that the model prevents a range of recent attacks. We also show that it can be implemented with negligible performance overhead (both at load time and at runtime), low hardware complexity, and minimal changes to the commodity OS and hypervisor code.

28 May 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DTDaniel Townley
Daniel Townley
YKYoung Kim
Young Kim
FDFred Douglis
Fred Douglis
JEJesse Elwell
Jesse Elwell
CSConstantin Serban
Constantin Serban
LZLixia Zhang
Lixia Zhang
Packet encapsulation is a general network technique that provides an essential building block for constructing secure networks. While extensively used in IP networks over the last few decades, secure packet encapsulation remains largely unexplored in the context of Named Data Networking (NDN) networks. NDN represents a radical departure from traditional endpoint-oriented networking by making secured data the centerpiece of communication. This new data-centric design brings both advantages and new challenges for the development of secure packet encapsulation that can preserve essential properties of an NDN network, including in-network data caching and builtin multicast data delivery. In this paper, we first identify the major differences between encapsulation solution designs in IP and NDN, highlighting the ensuing challenges, both inherent and practical. We then present a novel design to achieve secure NDN data packet encapsulation, and showcase an implementation suite that enables efficient fetching of securely encapsulated data. 1 1 The views, opinions and/or findings expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. Distribution Statement “A” (Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited)