Ghislaine Labouret

Ghislaine Labouret

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Ghislaine Labouret

Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, EHESS, CNRS, PSL University, 75005 Paris, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 February 2021 in Nature Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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CSClaire Sergent
Claire Sergent
MCMartina Corazzol
Martina Corazzol
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
FSFrançois Stockart
François Stockart
MWMark Wexler
Mark Wexler
DPDaniel Pressnitzer
Daniel Pressnitzer
An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

18 November 2022 in European Psychiatry
Verified
Journal Article
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CWCamille Michèle Williams
Camille Michèle Williams
HPHugo Peyre
Hugo Peyre
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
JFJudicael Fassaya
Judicael Fassaya
AGAdoración Guzmán García
Adoración Guzmán García
FRFranck Ramus
Franck Ramus
Background: Studies reporting that highly intelligent individuals have more mental health disorders often have sampling bias, no or inadequate control groups, or insufficient sample size. We addressed these caveats by examining the difference in the prevalence of mental health disorders between individuals with high and average general intelligence (g-factor) in the UK Biobank. Methods: Participants with g-factor scores standardized relative to the same-age UK population, were divided into two groups: a high g-factor group (g-factor 2 SD above the UK mean; N = 16,137) and an average g-factor group (g-factor within 2 SD of the UK mean; N = 236,273). Using self-report questionnaires and medical diagnoses, we examined group differences in the prevalence of 32 phenotypes, including mental health disorders, trauma, allergies, and other traits. Results: High and average g-factor groups differed across 15/32 phenotypes and did not depend on sex and/or age. Individuals with high g-factors had less general anxiety (odds ratio [OR] = 0.69, 95% CI [0.64;0.74]) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; OR = 0.67, 95 %CI [0.61;0.74]), were less neurotic (β = −0.12, 95% CI [−0.15;−0.10]), less socially isolated (OR = 0.85, 95% CI [0.80;0.90]), and were less likely to have experienced childhood stressors and abuse, adulthood stressors, or catastrophic trauma (OR = 0.69–0.90). However, they generally had more allergies (e.g., eczema; OR = 1.13–1.33). Conclusions: The present study provides robust evidence that highly intelligent individuals do not have more mental health disorders than the average population. High intelligence even appears as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD.

1 December 2020 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AFAndreas Falck
Andreas Falck
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
VIVéronique Izard
Véronique Izard
AWAnnie E. Wertz
Annie E. Wertz
FKFrank C. Keil
Frank C. Keil
BSBrent Strickland
Brent Strickland
From an early age, humans intuitively expect physical objects to obey core principles, including continuity (objects follow spatiotemporally continuous paths) and solidity (two solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time). These 2 principles are sometimes viewed as deriving from a single overarching "persistence" principle. Indeed, violations of solidity where one solid object seemingly passes through another could theoretically be interpreted as a violation of continuity, with an object "teleporting" to switch places rather than passing through a solid obstacle. However, it is an empirical issue whether the two principles are processed distinctly or identically to one another. Here, adult participants tracked objects during dynamic events in a novel location detection task, which sometimes involved violations of the principles of continuity or solidity. Although participants explicitly noticed both types of violations and reported being equally surprised at both, they made more errors and answered more slowly after continuity violations than after solidity violations. Our results demonstrate that the two principles show different signature patterns and are thus represented distinctly in the mind.

1 September 2015 in Journal of Vision
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBrent Strickland
Brent Strickland
AWAnnie Wertz
Annie Wertz
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
FKFrank Keil
Frank Keil
VIVeronique Izard
Veronique Izard
Infant looking-time results (Spelke, 1994) have shown that pre-verbal infants grasp the continuity principle (i.e. that objects cannot pop in and out of existence) and the solidity principle (i.e. that solid objects cannot pass through one-another) from around 3 months of age. Early theories assimilated both by treating solidity as resulting from a single, general principle of object continuity. However, more recent work on primates and older children (Santos, 2004; Keen, 2003) has suggested that children and primates have a greater mastery over continuity than solidity in action-based tasks. One potential explanation for this is that the vision/action system places a higher priority on continuity than solidity in object tracking. Here we tested this hypothesis directly using a novel object detection task. Adult participants viewed short videos depicting an object rolling behind one or two occluding screens. The occluding screen(s) then dropped, revealing the ball in a location either indicative of a continuity/solidity violation or non-violation, and participants were required to indicate the location in which they perceived the ball via keypress within 750ms. Participants were tested in one of two learning conditions: a 75% non-violation condition or a 75% violation condition. Across three experiments, we observed (consistent with our original hypothesis): (1) A larger decrease in accuracy for violations relative to non-violations in the continuity than solidity condition. (2) A consistent three-way interaction between learning condition, physical principle (solidity vs. continuity), and violation. This three-way interaction resulted from the fact that in the 75% violation condition, participants learned to overturn solidity but not continuity based anticipations. Taken together these findings suggest that the visual system indeed places a higher priority on object continuity than solidity, and so offer a potential explanation for some puzzling developmental results. Meeting presented at VSS 2015

23 September 2025 in European Psychiatry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CWCamille Michèle Williams
Camille Michèle Williams
HPHugo Peyre
Hugo Peyre
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
JFJudicael Fassaya
Judicael Fassaya
AGAdoración Guzmán García
Adoración Guzmán García
FRFranck Ramus
Franck Ramus
High intelligence is not associated with a greater propensity for mental health disorders – CORRIGENDUM - Volume 68 Issue 1