Moein Ghaniyoun

Moein Ghaniyoun

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Moein Ghaniyoun

The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MGMoein Ghaniyoun
Moein Ghaniyoun
KBKristin Barber
Kristin Barber
YXYuan Xiao
Yuan Xiao
YZYinqian Zhang
Yinqian Zhang
RTRadu Teodorescu
Radu Teodorescu
Trusted execution environments (TEE) are CPU hardware extensions that provide security guarantees for applications running on untrusted operating systems. The security of TEEs is threatened by a variety of microarchitectural vulnerabilities, which have led to a large number of demonstrated attacks. While various solutions for verifying the correctness and security of TEE designs have been proposed, they generally do not extend to jointly verifying the security of the underlying microarchitecture. This paper presents TEESec, the first pre-silicon framework for discovering microarchitectural vulnerabilities in the context of trusted execution environments. TEESec is designed to jointly and systematically test the TEE and underlying microarchitecture against data and metadata leakage across isolation boundaries. We implement TEESec in the Chipyard framework and evaluate it on two open-source RISC-V out-of-order processors running the Keystone TEE. Using TEESec we uncover 10 distinct vulnerabilities in these processors that violate TEE security principles and could lead to leakage of enclave secrets.

14 February 2022 in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KBKristin Barber
Kristin Barber
MGMoein Ghaniyoun
Moein Ghaniyoun
YZYinqian Zhang
Yinqian Zhang
RTRadu Teodorescu
Radu Teodorescu
Microarchitectural vulnerabilities have become an increasingly effective attack vector. This is especially problematic for security critical applications, which handle sensitive data and may employ software-level hardening in order to thwart data leakage. These strategies rely on necessary assumptions about the underlying microarchitectural implementation, which may (and have proven to be) incorrect in some instances, leading to exploits. Consequently, devising early-stage design tools for reasoning about and verifying the correctness of high assurance applications with respect to a given hardware design is an increasingly important problem. This letter presents a principled dynamic testing methodology to reveal and analyze data-dependent microarchitectural behavior with the potential to violate assumptions and requirements of security critical software. A differential analysis is performed of the microarchitectural state space explored during register transfer-level (RTL) simulation to reveal internal activity which correlates to sensitive data used in computation. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology through it's ability to identify secret data leakage from selected case studies with known vulnerabilities.