Sander Van de Cruys

Sander Van de Cruys

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Sander Van de Cruys

Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2014 in Psychological Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
KEKris Evers
Kris Evers
RHRuth Van der Hallen
Ruth Van der Hallen
LELien Van Eylen
Lien Van Eylen
BBBart Boets
Bart Boets
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans
There have been numerous attempts to explain the enigma of autism, but existing neurocognitive theories often provide merely a refined description of 1 cluster of symptoms. Here we argue that deficits in executive functioning, theory of mind, and central coherence can all be understood as the consequence of a core deficit in the flexibility with which people with autism spectrum disorder can process violations to their expectations. More formally we argue that the human mind processes information by making and testing predictions and that the errors resulting from violations to these predictions are given a uniform, inflexibly high weight in autism spectrum disorder. The complex, fluctuating nature of regularities in the world and the stochastic and noisy biological system through which people experience it require that, in the real world, people not only learn from their errors but also need to (meta-)learn to sometimes ignore errors. Especially when situations (e.g., social) or stimuli (e.g., faces) become too complex or dynamic, people need to tolerate a certain degree of error in order to develop a more abstract level of representation. Starting from an inability to flexibly process prediction errors, a number of seemingly core deficits become logically secondary symptoms. Moreover, an insistence on sameness or the acting out of stereotyped and repetitive behaviors can be understood as attempts to provide a reassuring sense of predictive success in a world otherwise filled with error. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

1 January 2011 in I-Perception
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Journal Article
Open access
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SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans
The predictive coding model is increasingly and fruitfully used to explain a wide range of findings in perception. Here we discuss the potential of this model in explaining the mechanisms underlying aesthetic experiences. Traditionally art appreciation has been associated with concepts such as harmony, perceptual fluency, and the so-called good Gestalt. We observe that more often than not great artworks blatantly violate these characteristics. Using the concept of prediction error from the predictive coding approach, we attempt to resolve this contradiction. We argue that artists often destroy predictions that they have first carefully built up in their viewers, and thus highlight the importance of negative affect in aesthetic experience. However, the viewer often succeeds in recovering the predictable pattern, sometimes on a different level. The ensuing rewarding effect is derived from this transition from a state of uncertainty to a state of increased predictability. We illustrate our account with several example paintings and with a discussion of art movements and individual differences in preference. On a more fundamental level, our theorizing leads us to consider the affective implications of prediction confirmation and violation. We compare our proposal to other influential theories on aesthetics and explore its advantages and limitations.

1 January 2013 in I-Perception
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
LDLee De-Wit
Lee De-Wit
KEKris Evers
Kris Evers
BBBart Boets
Bart Boets
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans
Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue that a Bayesian framework can help us understand the perceptual peculiarities in autism. We agree, but we think that their assumption of uniformly flat or equivocal priors in autism is not empirically supported. Moreover, we argue that any full account has to take into consideration not only the nature of priors in autism, but also how these priors are constructed or learned. We argue that predictive coding provides a more constrained framework that very naturally explains how priors are constructed in autism leading to strong, but overfitted, and non-generalizable predictions.

1 March 2017 in Brain and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
RHRuth Van der Hallen
Ruth Van der Hallen
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans

1 December 2017 in Vision Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RCRebecca Chamberlain
Rebecca Chamberlain
RHRuth Van der Hallen
Ruth Van der Hallen
HHHanne Huygelier
Hanne Huygelier
SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans

21 November 2017 in Clinical Psychological Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SCSander Van de Cruys
Sander Van de Cruys
SVSteven Vanmarcke
Steven Vanmarcke
IPInes Van de Put
Ines Van de Put
JWJohan Wagemans
Johan Wagemans
An amorphous collection of black and white patches (so-called Mooney images) can be perceived dramatically differently before versus after exposure to the natural source image. Prior experience causes the patches to (re)organize and fit together in a meaningful whole. Given recent hypotheses on a weaker role of priors in perception in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), we looked at improvements in recognition accuracy for Mooney images, before and after exposure to their source image, in typically developing (TD) individuals varying in ASD-like traits, and in a clinical group of adolescents with ASD (versus matched TD sample). We found typical prior-based performance improvements irrespective of ASD-like traits or ASD diagnosis, suggesting that the fast formation and application of specific priors is preserved in ASD. Together with earlier studies reporting intact use of other types of perceptual priors, these findings narrow down the candidate Bayesian accounts that are plausible for ASD.