29 January 2018 in Nature Climate Change
Green bonds are seen as a key instrument to unlock climate finance. While their volume has grown steadily in recent years, the impact of the ‘green’ label on the bond market is poorly understood. Here, we investigate the differences between the yield term structures of green and conventional bonds in the US municipal bond market. We show that, although returns on conventional bonds are on average higher than for green bonds, the differences can largely be explained by the fundamental properties of the bonds. Historically, green bonds have been penalized on the municipal market, being traded at lower prices and higher yields than expected by their credit profiles. In recent years, however, the credit quality of municipal green bonds has increased and the premium turned positive. Green bonds are thus becoming an increasingly attractive investment, with scope to bridge the climate finance gap for mitigation and adaptation.
19 June 2020 in Economics of Disasters and Climate Change
This paper estimates the cost of the lockdown of some sectors of the world economy in the wake of COVID-19. We develop a multi sector disequilibrium model with buyer-seller relations between agents located in different countries. The production network model allows us to study not only the direct cost of the lockdown but also indirect costs which emerge from the reductions in the availability of intermediate inputs. Agents determine the quantity of output and the proportions in which to combine inputs using prices that emerge from local interactions. The model is calibrated to the world economy using input-output data on 56 industries in 44 countries including all major economies. Within our model, the lockdowns are implemented as partial reductions in the output of some sectors using data on sectoral decomposition of capacity reductions. We use computational experiments to replicate the temporal sequence of the lockdowns implemented in different countries. World output falls by 7% at the early stage of the crisis when only China is under lockdown and by 23% at the peak of the crisis when many countries are under a lockdown. These direct impacts are amplified as the shock propagates through the world economy because of the buyer-seller relations. Supply-chain spillovers are capable of amplifying the direct impact by more than two folds. Naturally, the substitutability between intermediate inputs is a major determinant of the amplification. We also study the process of economic recovery following the end of the lockdowns. Price flexibility and minor technological adaptations help in reducing the time it takes for the economy to recover. The world economy takes about one quarter to move towards the new equilibrium in the optimistic and unlikely scenario of the end of all lockdowns. Recovery time is likely to be significantly greater if partial lockdowns persist.
17 June 2019 in Nature Climate Change
4 May 2021 in Climatic Change
19 November 2023 in European Journal of Operational Research
1 February 2018 in Mathematics of Operations Research
We consider a model of influence with a set of nonstrategic agents and two strategic agents. The nonstrategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed and opposed opinions. They each form a link with a nonstrategic agent in order to influence the average opinion that emerges due to interactions in the network. This procedure defines a zero-sum game whose players are the two strategic agents and whose strategy set is the set of nonstrategic agents. We focus on the existence and the characterization of pure strategy equilibria in this setting. Simple examples show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium does depend on the structure of the network. We characterize equilibrium with two notions: the influenceability of target agents, and their centrality, which in our context we call “intermediacy.” We also show that when the two strategic agents have the same impact, symmetric equilibria emerge as natural solutions. In the case where the impacts are uneven, the game has only equilibria in mixed strategies, the high impact agent focuses on his own centrality/intermediacy and the influenceability of his opponent’s target while the low influence agent focuses on the influenceability of his own target.